## Facts

- A trustee owned a six-lot subdivision in Gloucester, Massachusetts, including Lot 4A, and sought residential development after obtaining required building and sewage permits.
- A group of neighboring homeowners (not abutters) opposed development and had participated in administrative proceedings and litigation concerning multiple lots in the subdivision for years.
- After a local board granted an on-site sewage disposal permit, the neighbors’ attorney sought administrative review and rescission, then the neighbors filed a Superior Court action for declaratory and injunctive relief about the sewage system.
- The neighbors obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction; the developer asserted the suit was brought in bad faith to delay a permitted project.
- The developer counterclaimed for abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), alleging threats and an intent to stop construction “at all costs.”
- After an earlier appeal remanded the matter, the trial court: (a) granted summary judgment for the neighbors on the developer’s abuse-of-process and IIED counterclaims; (b) denied the developer’s requests for declaratory-judgment costs and Rule 11 sanctions; and (c) denied the neighbors’ renewed anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss.
- Both sides appealed: the developer challenged the summary judgment and the denials of costs/sanctions; the neighbors challenged denial of the anti-SLAPP motion.

## Issues

1. Whether summary judgment was proper on the developer’s abuse-of-process counterclaim where evidence suggested the neighbors used litigation primarily to obstruct development.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper on the developer’s IIED counterclaim, including whether the trustee was the real party in interest and whether the alleged conduct could be found “extreme and outrageous.”
3. Whether the developer properly obtained appellate review of the denial of costs under G.L. c. 231, § 6F and whether denial of Rule 11(a) sanctions was an abuse of discretion.
4. Whether the neighbors were entitled to dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute, G.L. c. 231, § 59H, or whether the developer showed the petitioning was devoid of reasonable factual or legal support and caused actual injury.

## Decision

- Reversed the grant of summary judgment for the neighbors on the developer’s abuse-of-process counterclaim; triable issues existed as to the neighbors’ motive and purpose in using process.
- Reversed the grant of summary judgment for the neighbors on the developer’s IIED counterclaim; triable issues existed on the real-party-in-interest question and whether the conduct could be deemed extreme and outrageous.
- Affirmed denial of the neighbors’ special motion to dismiss under G.L. c. 231, § 59H; even if the neighbors met the initial “based on petitioning” showing, the developer presented evidence the petitioning was devoid of reasonable support and caused actual injury.
- Affirmed the denial of Rule 11(a) sanctions; no abuse of discretion.
- Declined appellate review of the denial of costs under G.L. c. 231, § 6F because the developer failed to follow the statute’s required appellate procedure.

## Legal Principles

- Abuse of process requires (1) use of process, (2) for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose, and (3) resulting damage; intent and motive are commonly fact questions not suited to summary judgment when supported by evidence.
- IIED requires extreme and outrageous conduct, intent or reckless disregard, causation, and severe emotional distress; whether conduct meets the “extreme and outrageous” standard may present a jury question when the record supports competing inferences.
- Under G.L. c. 231, § 59H, once a moving party shows a claim is based on petitioning activity, the nonmoving party may defeat dismissal by showing the petitioning was devoid of any reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law and that it caused actual injury.
- Denial of Rule 11(a) sanctions is reviewed deferentially; sanctions are not required absent a clear showing of improper purpose or lack of legal/factual basis.
- Appellate review of a denial of costs under G.L. c. 231, § 6F depends on compliance with the statute’s specific procedural route; failure to follow it bars review.

## Conclusion

The Appeals Court held that evidence of prolonged opposition and alleged threats created triable disputes over whether the neighbors misused litigation to block a permitted development and whether their conduct could support IIED, while also concluding the developer’s showing of baseless petitioning and actual injury defeated anti-SLAPP dismissal and that procedural and discretionary limits foreclosed relief on costs and Rule 11 sanctions.


Vittands v. Sudduth, 730 N.E.2d 325 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)