## Facts

- Stephen Voisine and William Armstrong each had prior Maine misdemeanor assault convictions that could be satisfied by “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly” causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact.
- Armstrong’s conviction also satisfied Maine’s domestic-violence variant by involving a family or household member.
- After those convictions, federal investigators found Voisine possessed a rifle and found Armstrong possessed multiple firearms and ammunition.
- The United States charged both with unlawful firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which applies to persons convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
- Petitioners argued their predicate convictions did not qualify because they could have rested on reckless conduct, which they claimed is not a “use . . . of physical force” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).

## Issues

1. Whether a misdemeanor domestic-assault conviction that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness has, as an element, the “use or attempted use of physical force” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).
2. If so, whether such a conviction triggers the federal firearm-possession ban in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit by a 6–2 vote.
- The Court held that a reckless domestic-assault conviction qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under § 921(a)(33)(A).
- Because it qualifies, it triggers § 922(g)(9)’s prohibition on firearm possession.
- The majority reasoned that a person who recklessly causes bodily injury “uses” physical force in ordinary meaning, and the statute contains no carveout excluding reckless conduct.
- The dissent argued “use” implies intentional conduct and that the majority’s reading sweeps too broadly.

## Legal Principles

- For § 921(a)(33)(A), the “use . . . of physical force” element includes force applied with a mens rea of recklessness, not only knowing or intentional applications of force.
- Section 922(g)(9) applies to qualifying misdemeanor domestic-violence convictions even when the predicate offense can be committed recklessly.
- Recklessness is distinct from accident, negligence, or involuntary conduct; a conscious disregard of a substantial risk can still constitute a “use” of force for this statutory definition.
- Statutory interpretation may consider Congress’s aim in enacting § 922(g)(9) to prevent firearm possession by domestic-violence misdemeanants who often are not convicted of felonies.

## Conclusion

The Court held that reckless misdemeanor domestic-assault convictions satisfy the federal definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” so they support prosecutions under § 922(g)(9)’s firearm-possession ban.


Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686 (2016)