## Facts

- V.T.C. Lines, Inc. (VTC) operated as a common carrier of passengers for hire and maintained a bus station and garage in Harlan, Kentucky.
- VTC’s bus station and garage were located across the street from a municipal recreational facility owned and operated by the City of Harlan, including a public swimming pool.
- In the spring of 1953, the City cleaned the swimming pool by sandblasting it over several days.
- The sandblasting allegedly produced large amounts of emery dust that settled in and on VTC’s station and garage.
- VTC alleged that the dust entered and affected the diesel engines used in its buses.
- VTC explained that diesel engines draw in large quantities of air as part of their operation and that dust-laden air caused excessive wear to metal and moving parts, shortening engine life and usefulness.
- VTC sued the City seeking compensation for damage to its private property, relying on Ky. Const. § 242 (requiring just compensation for property “taken, injured or destroyed” by municipal and other corporations with the privilege of taking property for public use).
- The City defended by asserting, among other things, that (a) the claim involved personal property not subject to “taking” under § 242 and (b) operating and maintaining the pool was a governmental function giving the City immunity from liability.
- The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint; VTC appealed.

## Issues

1. Does Ky. Const. § 242 allow a claim for just compensation when municipal activity allegedly causes direct physical injury to private property, rather than a formal condemnation or physical appropriation?
2. Does § 242 apply to personal property (such as bus engines) as well as real property?
3. Can a city avoid a § 242 compensation claim by labeling the activity a governmental function and asserting governmental immunity?
4. Was summary judgment proper where the complaint alleged physical injury to property caused by the City’s sandblasting operations?

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed the summary judgment.
- The court held that the complaint stated a compensable claim under Ky. Const. § 242 based on alleged injury or destruction of property caused by the City’s operations.
- The court rejected the trial court’s view that § 242 is limited to real property or to property that could be condemned in a traditional sense; the constitutional protection extends to personal property as well.
- The court indicated that governmental-function immunity does not defeat a claim grounded in the constitutional command of § 242 at the pleading/summary-judgment stage.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the recognition of a potential § 242 compensation claim.

## Legal Principles

- Ky. Const. § 242 requires municipal and other corporations invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use to make just compensation for property “taken, injured or destroyed” by them.
- Section 242 is not limited to formal condemnation or complete appropriation; it also covers physical injury or destruction caused by public-use activity.
- The term “property” in §§ 13 and 242 of the Kentucky Constitution includes both real and personal property.
- A municipality’s governmental-function label does not eliminate the Constitution’s requirement to compensate for property injured or destroyed in the course of municipal operations where § 242 applies.
- On summary judgment, if the complaint alleges direct physical damage to property from municipal action, dismissal is improper merely because the claim involves personal property or because the city asserts governmental immunity.

## Conclusion

VTC alleged that emery dust from the City of Harlan’s sandblasting of a municipal swimming pool drifted onto VTC’s premises and physically damaged the diesel engines of its buses. The Kentucky court reversed summary judgment for the City, holding that Ky. Const. § 242 can require compensation for property “injured or destroyed,” that the protection applies to personal as well as real property, and that governmental-function immunity does not bar such a constitutional compensation claim at the summary-judgment stage.


V.T.C. Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573 (1957)