## Facts

- Calumet City, Illinois adopted a point-of-sale ordinance requiring inspection, code compliance, payment of fees, and issuance of transfer stamps before property could be sold.
- Inspectors could require correction of building or zoning code violations as a condition of sale and could assess whether a property had been illegally converted to a multi-family use.
- Ayanna Walker owned a multi-family dwelling in the city and sought to sell it, alleging the ordinance impeded her ability to transfer the property.
- After a prior challenge to the ordinance was dismissed without prejudice, Walker filed a new action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting: (1) unreasonable restraint on alienability, (2) denial of procedural due process, and (3) improper application to legal nonconforming property.
- During the litigation, the City represented that it would not enforce the ordinance against Walker and that her property complied and required no further inspections.
- The district court dismissed the case as moot, then awarded Walker attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a “prevailing party.”
- The City appealed only the fee award.

## Issues

1. Whether a § 1983 plaintiff whose case is dismissed as moot after the defendant voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct is a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 absent a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree (or equivalent).

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the attorneys’ fee award.
- Walker was not a “prevailing party” because there was no judicially sanctioned, material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship.
- The mootness dismissal merely reflected the City’s voluntary assurances and did not impose enforceable obligations or retain jurisdiction.
- The dismissal order was not equivalent to a consent decree because it lacked mandatory terms and an enforcement mechanism.

## Legal Principles

- “Prevailing party” status under § 1988 requires a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties with judicial imprimatur, typically through a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree (or functional equivalent).
- A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, even if prompted by the lawsuit and even if it affords complete practical relief, does not confer prevailing-party status without judicially sanctioned relief (rejection of the catalyst theory).
- An order that merely dismisses a case as moot based on a defendant’s representations—without mandatory language, enforceability, or retained jurisdiction—does not supply the necessary judicial imprimatur.

## Conclusion

Because the case ended in mootness based on the City’s voluntary decision not to enforce the ordinance against Walker, and the court issued no merits judgment or enforceable decree, Walker did not prevail for § 1988 purposes and was not entitled to attorneys’ fees.


Walker v. Calumet City, 565 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 2009)