## Facts

- The Arrows Formula One team principals (Walkinshaw and others) entered a written driver agreement with Pedro Diniz on October 24, 1997 for the 1998 and 1999 F1 seasons.
- The agreement operated within the 1997 Concorde Agreement framework and included a standard dispute-resolution provision referring certain disputes to the Contract Recognition Board (CRB).
- The contract was registered with the CRB in November 1997.
- Disputes later arose concerning the end of the parties’ relationship for the 1999 season and the resulting contractual and financial consequences.
- Walkinshaw and others sued Diniz in the English Commercial Court for relief arising from alleged wrongful termination and related consequences.
- Diniz applied to stay the court action under Arbitration Act 1996 § 9, contending the CRB process was the parties’ agreed arbitration forum and that CRB proceedings were pending.

## Issues

1. Whether the clause referring disputes to the CRB constituted an “arbitration agreement” within Arbitration Act 1996 § 6.
2. Whether the CRB process was “arbitration” such that the court action had to be stayed under Arbitration Act 1996 § 9.
3. Whether the scope of the CRB’s jurisdiction matched the matters pleaded in the Commercial Court action, including termination and damages.
4. Whether procedural features of the CRB process affected its status as an arbitral tribunal or the availability of a § 9 stay.

## Decision

- The High Court held that, for the category of disputes assigned to it under the Concorde/contract scheme, the CRB performed an arbitral function and the parties had agreed in writing to submit those disputes to it.
- The court nonetheless refused to stay the Commercial Court proceedings under Arbitration Act 1996 § 9.
- The refusal was based on the mismatch between the CRB’s limited function (contract recognition/registration disputes within the F1 structure) and the broader court claims (termination issues and damages).
- The CRB’s expedited and restrictive procedures supported the conclusion that it was not the agreed forum for the full range of contractual issues raised in the court action, though those procedures did not negate arbitral character for narrower matters.

## Legal Principles

- An “arbitration agreement” may exist based on function and substance: a written commitment to submit disputes to a third-party tribunal for a binding determination can qualify even if not labeled “arbitration.”
- A specialist tribunal embedded in a private regulatory regime may be treated as an arbitral tribunal when it determines disputes inter partes with binding effect for defined subject matter.
- A mandatory stay under Arbitration Act 1996 § 9 applies only to matters the parties agreed to refer to arbitration; if the action includes issues outside the arbitral forum’s jurisdiction, a stay may be refused (or cannot be compelled) for the action as brought.
- Procedural limitations in a specialist tribunal may inform the scope of disputes the parties are taken to have committed to that forum, without necessarily depriving the body of arbitral status for its intended role.

## Conclusion

The High Court recognized the CRB as arbitral in character for limited Concorde-related contract-recognition disputes, but denied a statutory stay because the Commercial Court action concerned broader termination and damages matters that were not wholly within the CRB’s remit.


Walkinshaw v. Diniz, [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 237 (Q.B. 2000)