## Facts

- A New York sports agency (plaintiffs) entered an “exclusive” player-agent agreement with a star Auburn University running back (Fullwood) to negotiate an NFL contract after the draft.
- While Fullwood was still a college athlete, plaintiffs paid him $4,000 (Aug. 20, 1986) evidenced by a promissory note secured by a security interest in his future professional football earnings.
- The written agency agreement was dated Jan. 2, 1987, the first day after Fullwood’s last college game when signing would not forfeit NCAA eligibility; the court inferred it was likely postdated to conceal an earlier, rule-violating deal.
- The agreement contained (i) an arbitration clause and (ii) a clause consenting to New York state and federal jurisdiction for disputes relating to the agreement.
- Before the 1987 NFL draft, Fullwood repudiated plaintiffs’ representation and retained an Alabama attorney (Kickliter) as agent.
- Fullwood was drafted in the first round by the Green Bay Packers and signed an NFL contract.
- Plaintiffs sued in federal court (diversity), seeking repayment of alleged loans, a commission on Fullwood’s NFL contract, and damages for alleged tortious interference and related business injuries.

## Issues

1. Whether the court had personal jurisdiction over Fullwood based on a contractual consent-to-jurisdiction clause.
2. Whether the court had personal jurisdiction over Kickliter under New York’s long-arm statute for alleged tortious interference.
3. Whether the player-agent agreement and the promissory note were unenforceable as contrary to public policy because they violated NCAA amateurism rules, and whether the parties were in pari delicto.
4. Whether the court should stay the case and compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act based on an arbitration clause contained in an unenforceable agreement.
5. Whether, in light of the above, plaintiffs were entitled to any contractual or tort relief.

## Decision

- The court found personal jurisdiction over Fullwood based on the agreement’s consent-to-jurisdiction clause.
- The court found no personal jurisdiction over Kickliter because he did not sign the agreement and the alleged tortious conduct did not create a sufficient New York nexus under the long-arm statute.
- The court held the agency agreement and related loan transaction were unenforceable as contrary to public policy because they were structured to evade and violate NCAA rules governing amateur eligibility.
- The court treated the parties as in pari delicto and refused to grant affirmative relief.
- The court denied the request to compel arbitration because the arbitration clause was part of an agreement deemed void on public-policy grounds.
- The court dismissed the claims against both defendants without granting relief.

## Legal Principles

- A valid contractual consent-to-jurisdiction clause can support personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for disputes arising out of or relating to the contract.
- New York long-arm jurisdiction does not extend to an out-of-state alleged tortfeasor absent a statutorily sufficient connection, including a qualifying in-state injury and related jurisdictional facts.
- Courts may refuse to enforce agreements that, even if not criminal, contravene public policy; enforcement may be denied where the agreement is designed to circumvent governing rules central to an institutional regime (here, amateur athletics eligibility rules).
- When parties are in pari delicto, a court may leave them where it finds them and deny recovery to both sides.
- The federal policy favoring arbitration does not require compelling arbitration under an agreement the court deems void and unenforceable on public-policy grounds.

## Conclusion

The court refused to enforce a college-athlete representation agreement and related loan secured by future professional earnings because the arrangement violated NCAA amateurism rules and public policy, denied arbitration sought under that agreement, found jurisdiction over the athlete based on a consent clause but not over the alleged interfering attorney, and dismissed the action without relief.


Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)