## Facts

- Christopher Walton was a minor resident student at the Mississippi School for the Deaf (a state-run residential school) and lived on campus under continuous supervision and restrictive rules.
- Walton was sexually assaulted twice by another student.
- After the first assault, school officials (including the superintendent, Alma Alexander) were notified and moved the assailant to a different dormitory.
- Dormitories were later consolidated, and Walton and the assailant were again housed together.
- A second assault occurred; this incident was not reported to Alexander.
- Walton sued Alexander under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in her individual capacity, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation for failure to protect his bodily integrity.
- The district court denied Alexander’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and Alexander took an interlocutory appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether a state-run residential school’s relationship with a resident student creates a Fourteenth Amendment “special relationship” imposing an affirmative constitutional duty to protect the student from private violence by another student.
2. Whether any such constitutional duty was clearly established at the time of the assaults, defeating the superintendent’s qualified immunity.

## Decision

- The en banc Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Alexander.
- The court held that no “special relationship” existed because Walton’s attendance at the residential school was voluntary and did not amount to involuntary state custody.
- The court further held that, in any event, it was not clearly established that a residential school superintendent had a constitutional duty to protect a student from assaults by other students.

## Legal Principles

- The Due Process Clause generally limits state action and does not impose an affirmative duty to protect individuals from private violence.
- A “special relationship” creating an affirmative constitutional duty to protect arises only when the state involuntarily restrains an individual’s liberty through custody comparable to incarceration or involuntary institutionalization.
- Extensive supervision and rules associated with school attendance, including residential schooling, do not by themselves constitute the involuntary custody required for a special relationship when attendance is voluntary.
- Qualified immunity bars damages unless the official violated a clearly established constitutional right such that a reasonable official would have known the conduct was unlawful.

## Conclusion

Because a voluntary residential student at a state school is not in the type of involuntary custody that triggers a due process duty of protection, and because no such duty was clearly established at the time, the superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity and judgment in her favor.


Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)