## Facts

- John M. Tyler and his wife sued Honeywell International, Inc., as successor to Bendix Corporation, alleging Tyler developed mesothelioma from asbestos-containing Bendix vehicle brakes.
- Tyler performed brake work over many years for friends, family, and neighbors, allegedly generating asbestos-containing brake dust.
- Tyler also had other substantial asbestos exposures, including during U.S. Navy service and work at Fort Belvoir in Virginia.
- Plaintiff’s causation proof relied mainly on expert testimony from Dr. Steven Markowitz, who attributed Tyler’s disease to multiple asbestos exposures.
- The case proceeded in federal court after removal from local court, and discovery closed under a scheduling order.
- After discovery, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided *Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer*, requiring proof that exposure to the defendant’s product alone was sufficient to cause the harm (rejecting a “substantial contributing factor” formulation).
- In response, plaintiff submitted a post-discovery expert declaration offering new opinions that each exposure site was independently sufficient to cause Tyler’s mesothelioma.
- Honeywell moved to strike the new declaration as untimely and renewed its summary-judgment motion on causation under the revised Virginia standard.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by striking the post-discovery expert declaration as improper and untimely rather than allowing it as supplementation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) or permitting additional discovery.
2. Whether, applying Virginia causation law after *Boomer*, plaintiff produced admissible expert evidence sufficient to create a triable issue that exposure to Bendix brakes alone was sufficient to cause Tyler’s mesothelioma.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the order striking the new expert declaration.
- The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for Honeywell.
- The court held the declaration amounted to new expert testimony offered after discovery and contrary to the scheduling order, not a permissible correction of prior disclosures.
- Without the stricken declaration, plaintiff lacked admissible expert evidence meeting Virginia’s requirement that the defendant’s product alone be sufficient to cause the disease; therefore, no reasonable jury could find causation.

## Legal Principles

- Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), expert “supplementation” is limited to correcting or completing prior disclosures and does not permit introducing new substantive expert theories after the disclosure deadlines.
- District courts have discretion to enforce scheduling orders and to strike untimely expert submissions, particularly when the proponent does not timely seek leave or other procedural relief.
- When an intervening change in substantive law occurs after discovery, a party seeking to adjust proof typically must request procedural relief (e.g., leave to modify deadlines or relief under Rule 56(d)); courts need not reopen the record on their own.
- Under Virginia law after *Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer*, a plaintiff in an asbestos exposure case must present evidence that exposure to the defendant’s product alone was sufficient to have caused the injury, not merely that it was a substantial factor among multiple exposures.
- In toxic-tort causation disputes, summary judgment is appropriate where the plaintiff lacks admissible expert evidence establishing the governing causation standard.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit upheld the district court’s enforcement of expert-disclosure deadlines and granted judgment to the defendant because, under Virginia’s post-*Boomer* causation rule, the plaintiff lacked admissible expert testimony that exposure to the defendant’s brake product alone was sufficient to cause the decedent’s mesothelioma.


Wannall v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 775 F.3d 425 (D.C. Cir. 2014)