## Facts

- Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. contracted in writing with Joan Brodel, a 17-year-old motion-picture actress, for exclusive dramatic services.
- The agreement provided a 52-week initial term at $600 per week and six successive 52-week option periods exercisable by Warner at increasing weekly salaries.
- Warner petitioned for judicial approval under former California Civil Code § 36, and the Los Angeles County Superior Court approved and incorporated the agreement into its order after notice and hearing.
- Brodel performed the initial term and three option periods after Warner exercised the first three options.
- After Brodel reached majority in January 1946, Warner notified her in February 1946 that it was exercising the fourth option.
- Brodel purported to disaffirm the agreement, refused further services, and entered into an acting contract with Nero Pictures, Inc. and Seymour Nebenzal.
- Warner sued for declaratory relief and an injunction enforcing the exclusive-services provisions and restraining the competing producers from employing Brodel.
- The trial court sustained defendants’ general demurrers without leave to amend; the Court of Appeal affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether a minor may disaffirm, upon reaching majority, an entertainment services contract that was approved by the superior court under former Civil Code § 36.
2. Whether the superior court’s § 36 approval (and the statute’s bar on disaffirmance) extends to option periods included in the approved written agreement.
3. Whether the complaint stated a basis for equitable relief enforcing an exclusive-services contract through a negative injunction against the performer and third-party employers.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment sustaining the demurrers.
- The court held that former Civil Code § 36 withdraws the minor’s power to disaffirm a court-approved entertainment services contract, including after the minor reaches majority.
- The court held that the approval order covered the entire agreement, including the option periods, because the order incorporated the contract and the options were an integral part of it.
- The court held that Warner’s allegations supported declaratory relief and potential injunctive enforcement of the exclusive-services provisions at the pleading stage.

## Legal Principles

- Former Civil Code § 36 bars disaffirmance of an otherwise valid entertainment services contract once it has been approved by the superior court; the statutory bar is a complete denial of the disaffirmance power within the statute’s scope.
- When an approval order incorporates the written agreement, the approval extends to all its terms, including option periods, absent statutory limitation.
- A party may not use a later disaffirmance theory to negate the effect of the prior approval order; challenges to the approval must be made by direct attack, not collateral attack.
- Although personal services are not specifically enforceable, equity may enforce an exclusive-services contract by negative injunction where the services are alleged to be unique and damages are alleged to be inadequate.
- On demurrer, allegations of unique services, exclusivity, and irreparable injury are sufficient to state a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.

## Conclusion

The court held that a superior court’s approval of a minor’s entertainment services contract under former Civil Code § 36 eliminates the minor’s later power to disaffirm, and that the approval may bind the performer to option periods incorporated in the approved agreement; Warner’s complaint therefore could proceed on claims for declaratory relief and negative injunctive enforcement of exclusivity.


Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d 949 (Cal. 1948)