## Facts

- The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) imposes reporting duties on “every employer” that makes certain payments or provides things of value to a labor organization or its officers, requiring a filing with the Secretary of Labor under § 203(a)(1).
- The Department of Labor implemented these reporting obligations through regulations and Form LM-10, whose instructions historically exempted gifts of “insubstantial value” under a flexible, case-by-case approach.
- Michael J. Warshauer, a personal-injury lawyer, served as “designated legal counsel” (DLC) recommended by a labor union to its members.
- In 2005, the Secretary of Labor issued website advisories stating that DLCs fall within the LMRDA definition of “employer” for § 203(a)(1) reporting and setting an administrative de minimis threshold of $250 for LM-10 reporting.
- After Warshauer made payments or provided items of value connected to his relationship with unions or union officials, the Department sent him a letter requiring him to file LM-10 reports.
- Warshauer asserted that the Department historically treated LM-10 reporting as directed mainly at employers involved in “persuader” activities and that the Department had not previously fixed a specific dollar amount for “insubstantial value.”

## Issues

1. Whether the Secretary reasonably interpreted the LMRDA to treat union-recommended DLC attorneys as “employers” required to report covered payments under § 203(a)(1).
2. Whether the 2005 website advisories (classifying DLCs as employers and setting a $250 de minimis threshold) were legislative rules requiring APA notice-and-comment procedures, or interpretive rules exempt from those procedures.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed judgment for the Secretary of Labor.
- The court upheld the Secretary’s interpretation that DLCs may qualify as “employers” for § 203(a)(1) reporting and that Warshauer could be required to file LM-10 reports for covered, non-de-minimis transactions.
- The court held the website advisories were interpretive rules that clarified existing statutory and regulatory requirements and therefore did not require notice-and-comment rulemaking.

## Legal Principles

- An agency’s interpretation may be upheld where the statutory text supports the agency’s reading and the interpretation is not arbitrary or capricious under APA review.
- LMRDA § 203(a)(1) imposes reporting obligations broadly on “every employer” making covered payments or providing things of value to a labor organization or its officers; the obligation is not limited by the statute’s text to employers engaged in “persuader” activity or collective-bargaining contexts.
- Interpretive rules explain an agency’s view of what existing law requires and generally do not require APA notice-and-comment procedures; legislative rules create new binding obligations with the force of law and generally do require those procedures.
- Agency guidance that clarifies how an existing reporting scheme applies to particular actors, and that operationalizes an existing de minimis concept with an administrable threshold, may be treated as interpretive rather than legislative where it does not amend the underlying statute or regulations.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit sustained the Secretary of Labor’s application of LMRDA § 203(a)(1) to union-designated attorneys who provide reportable things of value to unions or union officials and held that the Department’s website advisories were interpretive guidance exempt from APA notice-and-comment rulemaking.


Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2009)