## Facts

- A bicyclist, Mark G. Young, rode westbound in the curb (right) lane of Calvert Street, N.W., approaching an unusually configured intersection where Calvert ends and traffic may turn onto multiple streets.
- A Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) bus traveled alongside Young in the lane immediately to his left.
- Evidence indicated the bus driver had observed Young in the bus’s mirrors while the two proceeded side by side.
- As the bus approached the intersection, the driver initiated a sharp right turn across the curb lane and into Young’s path.
- Young testified the bus gave no warning of the right turn and did not appear to slow or brake before veering right.
- Young’s bicycle struck the side of the bus, and he fell beneath it; the bus continued forward and trapped Young under its right rear wheel.
- Young suffered severe injuries and sued WMATA for negligence in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to submit the last clear chance doctrine to the jury and to deny WMATA’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).
2. Whether the trial court’s supplemental instruction defining “concur,” in the context of concurrent negligence, misstated the law or misled the jury.
3. Whether the trial court erred by admitting WMATA’s standard operating procedures as evidence bearing on the standard of care.

## Decision

- The judgment for Young was affirmed.
- The court held the evidence, viewed most favorably to Young, was sufficient for reasonable jurors to find the bus driver had a last clear chance to avoid the collision; denial of JNOV was proper.
- The supplemental instruction defining “concur,” considered with the full set of instructions, did not misstate the relationship between concurrent negligence and last clear chance and was not prejudicial.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to consider WMATA’s standard operating procedures as some evidence of the standard of care.

## Legal Principles

- In a contributory negligence jurisdiction, a plaintiff may still recover if the defendant, after the plaintiff is in peril, has actual or constructive knowledge of that peril and a later, superior opportunity to avoid the harm by reasonable care, but fails to do so (last clear chance).
- JNOV is appropriate only when, taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, no reasonable juror could find for that party.
- Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole; an explanatory reinstruction is not reversible error if the overall charge adequately conveys the governing law and does not mislead the jury.
- A defendant’s internal procedures or manuals may be admitted as some evidence relevant to reasonable care, but they are not conclusive and do not, by themselves, set the legal standard of care.

## Conclusion

The court upheld a negligence verdict against WMATA where the jury found both contributory negligence and last clear chance, concluding that the evidentiary record permitted a finding that the bus driver retained a later opportunity to avoid injuring the bicyclist, and further finding no reversible error in the trial court’s instructions or in admitting WMATA’s operating procedures as evidence of reasonable care.


Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Young, 731 A.2d 389 (D.C. 1999)