## Facts

- In 1911, predecessors in interest conveyed a 70’ x 70’ parcel to Orchard Grange No. 346, which built and used a grange hall on the site.
- In 1950, successors to the original owners conveyed an adjacent, larger parcel (about two acres) to Orchard Grange by statutory warranty deed.
- The 1950 deed stated that the land “reverts back to original plot in event it is no longer used for Grange purposes.”
- The Grange used the 1950 parcel for parking and vehicular access associated with the hall.
- In 1964, the grantors of the 1950 deed contracted to sell their remaining property to Robert and Myrna Brandt; a deed conveying that remainder was delivered in 1984.
- In 2004, Orchard Grange dissolved, and the 1950 parcel was no longer used for Grange purposes; Orchard Grange’s interest passed to Washington State Grange.
- In 2005, the Brandts obtained a quitclaim deed from the grantor’s estate purporting to transfer any remaining interest in the 1950 parcel, and claimed ownership based on the asserted reversionary interest.
- Washington State Grange filed a quiet title action, contending the 1950 deed conveyed a fee simple absolute because the reversionary language was void under the rule against perpetuities.

## Issues

1. Whether the 1950 deed language created a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter in the grantors, or instead conveyed a fee simple absolute or a different defeasible estate.
2. Whether the rule against perpetuities invalidated the reversionary arrangement in the 1950 deed.
3. If some future interest created by the 1950 deed would be void under the rule against perpetuities, whether the defeasible fee nonetheless remains effective and what consequence follows for title after Grange use ended.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment for Washington State Grange.
- The court held the 1950 deed conveyed a fee simple determinable to Orchard Grange.
- The court held the deed reserved a possibility of reverter in the grantors (and their successors), and that this retained interest was not void under the rule against perpetuities.
- The court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that the reversionary clause was void in its entirety and that the Grange therefore held a fee simple absolute.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the characterization of the 1950 deed and its future interest.

## Legal Principles

- Deed language providing that land “reverts” upon cessation of a specified use ordinarily creates a fee simple determinable in the grantee and a possibility of reverter retained by the grantor.
- A grantor’s retained possibility of reverter is traditionally not subject to the rule against perpetuities.
- If a deed is construed to include an executory future interest that would be void under the rule against perpetuities, the proper remedy is to treat that invalid future interest as void without converting the grantee’s estate into a fee simple absolute where the deed otherwise establishes a fee simple determinable.
- When the durational limitation in a fee simple determinable is satisfied (here, the property is no longer used for the specified purpose), the grantee’s estate terminates automatically and title returns to the holder of the possibility of reverter.

## Conclusion

The court held that the “reverts back” clause in the 1950 deed created a fee simple determinable conditioned on continued Grange use and reserved a valid possibility of reverter in the grantors, unaffected by the rule against perpetuities; therefore, summary judgment quieting title in Washington State Grange as fee simple absolute was reversed.


Wash. State Grange v. Brandt, 148 P.3d 1069 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)