## Facts

- Two dissolution actions were consolidated because each involved a spouse who supported the other through veterinary school and the marriage ended before the community received the expected financial benefit.
- In Washburn, the parties married while in college; after graduation, they moved so the husband could attend veterinary school while the wife worked full time and the husband worked part time and summers.
- After the degree, the couple relocated for internships and later returned to Washington, where the husband began veterinary practice; the parties separated and dissolved their marriage shortly thereafter.
- The Washburn trial court divided limited community assets, assigned educational and other community debts to the husband, denied maintenance to the wife, and refused to treat the husband’s degree or increased earning capacity as divisible property; it also excluded expert valuation testimony.
- In Gillette, the parties agreed the husband would pursue a veterinary degree with the expectation of shared future benefits; the wife worked full time and made career sacrifices while relocating for the husband’s schooling.
- The Gillette trial court accepted an agreed property division, assigned educational loans to the husband, held the degree was not divisible property, but awarded the wife a $19,000 lump-sum equitable award payable over time and nominal maintenance.

## Issues

1. Whether a professional degree or the enhanced earning capacity associated with it constitutes “property” subject to division in dissolution.
2. Whether, and through what mechanisms, a supporting spouse’s contributions toward the other spouse’s professional education must be considered under Washington dissolution statutes governing property/debt division and maintenance.

## Decision

- The court held that a professional degree and the associated future earning capacity are not “property” subject to direct valuation and division in dissolution.
- The court held that the supporting spouse’s contributions to the attainment of the degree must be considered as part of an equitable distribution of property and liabilities and/or in awarding maintenance.
- In Washburn, the court reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to consider the wife’s contributions to the husband’s education in any respect when crafting the decree.
- In Gillette, the court affirmed because the trial court’s overall decree (debt allocation, lump-sum award, and nominal maintenance) permissibly accounted for the supporting spouse’s contributions within its discretion.

## Legal Principles

- A professional degree is nontransferable, lacks a conventional market value, and is personal to its holder; therefore it is not marital property subject to division.
- When spouses jointly invest in one spouse’s education with the expectation of future community benefit, equity requires the court to consider the supporting spouse’s contributions if dissolution occurs before the benefit is realized.
- Supporting-spouse contributions may be addressed through:
  - Equitable distribution of property and liabilities (including allocation of educational debt and possible lump-sum payments), and/or
  - Spousal maintenance.
- Trial courts have broad discretion in dissolution orders; appellate review focuses on whether the decree reflects consideration of the relevant statutory factors and avoids manifest abuse of discretion.
- In determining appropriate compensation, relevant considerations may include direct educational costs paid with community funds, foregone earning opportunities, sacrifices or delayed opportunities of the supporting spouse, the time between degree completion and dissolution (and any actual sharing of increased earnings), and each spouse’s age, health, and earning prospects.

## Conclusion

The court rejected treating a professional degree as divisible property but required dissolution courts to account for the supporting spouse’s educational contributions through equitable property/debt allocation and/or maintenance; failure to consider those contributions warrants reversal, while a decree that reasonably reflects them will be upheld.


Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (Wash. 1984)