## Facts

- Frieda M. Drapkin created a revocable inter vivos trust and, the same day, executed a will pouring her residuary estate into that trust as part of a single testamentary plan.
- The trust directed that, upon Drapkin’s death, the trustee convey a specifically identified apartment building at 12–14 Newton Street, Waltham, Massachusetts, to Elaine Wasserman.
- Drapkin never transferred the Newton Street property into the trust before selling it in 1988 for $575,000.
- Drapkin died in 1989; the Newton Street property was no longer owned at death, though sale proceeds remained in her general assets.
- Wasserman sued for declaratory relief seeking payment of the sale proceeds, arguing they should substitute for the missing property.
- The Probate and Family Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, ruling the gift was adeemed by extinction.
- Wasserman appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took direct appellate review.

## Issues

1. Whether ademption by extinction applies to a specific gift of real estate stated in a revocable inter vivos trust when the settlor sells the property before death.
2. Whether, when a will and revocable trust function as one testamentary plan, will doctrines governing classification and ademption apply to the trust disposition.
3. Whether Massachusetts should apply an intent-based approach allowing traceable sale proceeds to substitute for the specifically described property.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court held the Newton Street provision was a specific gift, and the sale of the property before death adeemed the gift by extinction.
- The court held that, where a will and revocable trust are parts of a single testamentary plan, the law of wills applies to the trust for purposes of classification and ademption.
- The court declined to replace Massachusetts’ identity approach to ademption with an intent-based approach and denied substitution of sale proceeds absent instrument language providing for that result.

## Legal Principles

- A disposition of a uniquely identified asset is a specific gift; if that asset is not owned at death, the gift is adeemed by extinction.
- Massachusetts follows the identity rule for ademption: the existence of the specifically described property at death controls, not the testator’s subjective intent or the traceability of proceeds.
- When a will pours over into a revocable trust as part of one testamentary scheme, traditional will doctrines (including classification of gifts and ademption) may govern the trust’s dispositive provisions.
- Sale proceeds from an adeemed specific gift do not pass to the named beneficiary unless the governing instruments expressly provide a substitute gift (e.g., proceeds or equivalent value).

## Conclusion

Because Drapkin sold the specifically described Newton Street property before her death and the trust did not provide for a substitute gift of proceeds, the specific gift to Wasserman was extinguished by ademption, and Wasserman had no right to the sale proceeds.


Wasserman v. Cohen, 414 Mass. 172 (1993)