## Facts

- Kentel Myrone Weaver was tried in Massachusetts for first-degree murder and a related offense.
- During two days of voir dire, a court officer excluded all members of the public who were not potential jurors, including Weaver’s mother and minister, due to courtroom capacity limits.
- The trial judge did not expressly order the closure; defense counsel did not object, and the issue was not raised on direct appeal.
- Weaver was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
- About five years later, Weaver sought a new trial, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object to the closure as a violation of the Sixth Amendment public-trial right.
- State courts recognized the closure as a public-trial violation and structural error, but denied relief because Weaver failed to show prejudice for purposes of the ineffective-assistance claim.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant who raises an unpreserved public-trial violation during jury selection solely through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must prove prejudice under *Strickland v. Washington*.
2. Whether prejudice is presumed when counsel’s deficient performance results in structural error.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (7–2) that when a public-trial violation is first raised through an ineffective-assistance claim, the defendant must demonstrate *Strickland* prejudice.
- The Court distinguished automatic reversal on preserved direct review from collateral review via ineffective assistance, where prejudice generally remains required.
- Assuming without deciding that counsel performed deficiently, the Court concluded Weaver failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome or that the closure rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.
- The dissent would have presumed prejudice once counsel’s deficient performance produced a structural public-trial violation.

## Legal Principles

- A violation of the Sixth Amendment public-trial right is structural error; when preserved and raised on direct review, it typically requires reversal without harmless-error analysis.
- In an ineffective-assistance claim, the defendant must prove deficient performance and prejudice under *Strickland*.
- When structural error is unpreserved and asserted only through ineffective assistance, prejudice is not automatically presumed; the defendant must show either:
  - a reasonable probability that the result would have been different absent counsel’s error, or
  - that the error was so serious as to render the proceeding fundamentally unfair.
- The availability of automatic reversal depends on the procedural posture and the way the violation is presented for review.

## Conclusion

The Court held that even though a courtroom closure during voir dire violates the public-trial right and is structural error, a defendant who raises that violation only through an ineffective-assistance claim must still prove prejudice under *Strickland* and is not entitled to automatic reversal.


Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017)