## Facts

- Joe Webb, a lumber mill worker, was clearing an upper floor by dropping a 75-pound pine block to the ground, a customary method for the job.
- Webb saw J. Greeley McGowin standing directly below where the block would have fallen and realized it would likely cause serious injury or death.
- To prevent the harm, Webb held onto the block and fell with it to divert its path, saving McGowin.
- Webb suffered severe injuries, including a broken right leg and right arm and loss of part of his right heel, leaving him permanently disabled.
- After the incident, McGowin agreed to pay Webb $15 every two weeks for the rest of Webb’s life in recognition of the life-saving act and Webb’s injuries.
- McGowin made the payments for about eight years until his death; McGowin’s executors then stopped paying.
- Webb sued the executors in assumpsit to enforce the promise and recover unpaid installments; the trial court sustained demurrers, and Webb appealed after taking a nonsuit.

## Issues

1. Whether a promisor’s later promise to pay for a previously conferred, unrequested benefit is supported by consideration when the benefit was material and substantial to the promisor’s person.
2. Whether a promise grounded in a “moral obligation” becomes legally enforceable when tied to a material benefit, notwithstanding the general rule against past consideration.

## Decision

- The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari and left standing the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s ruling sustaining demurrers.
- The Supreme Court approved the Court of Appeals’ distinction between mere ethical duty and a moral obligation arising from a material and substantial benefit to the promisor.
- The case proceeded with Webb’s complaint treated as stating a potentially enforceable contract on the alleged facts.

## Legal Principles

- A subsequent executory promise may be enforceable when made in recognition of a prior benefit if the promisor received a material and substantial benefit, particularly to the promisor’s person.
- A moral obligation alone, based only on ethics or gratitude without a material benefit to the promisor, is insufficient consideration.
- Preservation of the promisor’s life or bodily safety may qualify as a materially valuable benefit capable of supporting a later promise to pay.
- Although past consideration is generally not valid consideration, an exception may apply where the promise compensates for a prior, material benefit conferred on the promisor and associated harm incurred by the promisee in conferring it.

## Conclusion

The court permitted enforcement of a promise to provide lifetime payments where the promisor, after being saved from serious bodily harm or death, promised compensation for that material benefit and for the rescuer’s disabling injuries, recognizing a limited “material benefit” basis for consideration despite the benefit preceding the promise.


Webb v. McGowin, 232 Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (1936)