Webb v. McGowin, 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935), cert. denied, 232 Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (Ala. 1936)

Facts

  • Joe Webb, an employee at a lumber mill, was clearing an upper floor by dropping heavy pine blocks to the ground below.
  • As Webb was about to drop a block, he saw J. Greeley McGowin standing directly beneath where it would land and would likely be killed or seriously injured if Webb released it.
  • To prevent harm to McGowin, Webb held the block and fell with it to divert its path, successfully avoiding injury to McGowin.
  • Webb suffered severe injuries, including a broken leg and arm and substantial permanent disability, leaving him unable to perform physical or mental labor.
  • About four months later, McGowin agreed to pay Webb $15 every two weeks for the rest of Webb’s life and made those payments for roughly eight years, until McGowin’s death.
  • After McGowin died, the executors of his estate stopped making the payments, and Webb sued to recover unpaid installments and enforce the continuing obligation.

Issues

  1. Whether a promisor’s later promise to compensate a promisee for a past, unrequested life-saving act is supported by consideration when the promisor received a material benefit and the promisee suffered serious injury.
  2. Whether “moral obligation” coupled with a material or pecuniary benefit can supply consideration sufficient to make the subsequent promise enforceable against the promisor’s estate.

Decision

  • The Alabama Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s sustaining of demurrers and the resulting judgment of nonsuit.
  • The court held the amended complaint stated a cause of action because the promisor’s receipt of a material benefit made the subsequent promise enforceable.
  • The case was remanded for further proceedings.
  • The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving the appellate decision in effect.
  • A past act is generally not consideration for a later promise, and a purely moral obligation alone does not create contractual liability.
  • A subsequent promise may be enforceable when the promisee’s prior act conferred a substantial material or pecuniary benefit on the promisor, supporting the promise as supported by consideration.
  • Preservation of a person’s life and bodily safety can constitute a material benefit with pecuniary value for consideration analysis.
  • Serious detriment to the promisee incurred in conferring the benefit reinforces the existence of consideration supporting the later promise.
  • A later promise to pay for services rendered may be treated as implying a prior request as a matter of law in appropriate circumstances, supporting enforcement.

Conclusion

The court enforced a promisor’s later promise to make lifetime payments where the promisee’s earlier life-saving act conferred a concrete material benefit on the promisor and caused grave injury to the promisee, treating the resulting moral obligation as sufficient consideration to bind the promisor’s estate.