Webb v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 166 Vt. 119, 692 A.2d 343 (Vt. 1996)

Facts

  • Bruce Webb rode on the rear of a farm tractor manufactured by Navistar while it was driven on a public highway at night.
  • The tractor had rear visibility equipment (flashing amber lights, a red taillight, and a slow-moving-vehicle reflective triangle), but the amber lights and taillight were not functioning.
  • Webb’s position on the tractor obscured the slow-moving-vehicle triangle.
  • A rear white “field light” was operating; plaintiffs claimed the design was defective because it allowed use of the rear white light on the highway without simultaneously operating proper red rear lighting, and because warnings were inadequate.
  • A car approaching from behind struck the tractor; the driver was alleged to be intoxicated.
  • Webb suffered serious injuries; Martha Webb asserted derivative damages claims.

Issues

  1. Whether comparative causation principles apply in Vermont strict products liability actions and, if so, whether the jury must be instructed to apportion responsibility under Vermont’s comparative negligence statute.
  2. Whether the evidence required judgment for Navistar because the tractor was not defective and/or warnings were adequate as a matter of law.
  3. Whether Webb’s own conduct made him more than 50% responsible as a matter of law, barring recovery under Vermont’s modified comparative negligence scheme.

Decision

  • The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the plaintiffs’ judgment and remanded for further proceedings; the Court was divided on the rationale.
  • A plurality concluded that comparative causation applies in this strict products liability case and that a new trial was required because the jury was not instructed on comparative causation.
  • One Justice would have directed judgment for Navistar because Webb’s fault exceeded 50% as a matter of law.
  • Another Justice would have directed judgment for Navistar because the tractor was not defective as a matter of law.
  • Two Justices dissented from the reversal, favoring leaving the jury verdict intact.
  • Comparative causation may apply in Vermont strict products liability actions where the plaintiff’s conduct contributed to the injury.
  • When comparative causation is supported by the evidence, the jury must be instructed to allocate responsibility consistent with Vermont’s comparative negligence statute (including the rule barring recovery if plaintiff fault exceeds defendant fault).
  • Traditional strict liability defenses that can operate as complete bars (such as misuse or assumption of risk) may be treated through allocation of responsibility rather than all-or-nothing outcomes, depending on the case.
  • The decision did not adopt a single comprehensive rule for when comparative principles apply in all strict products liability cases or exactly how to implement them in every setting.

Conclusion

The court set aside the plaintiffs’ strict products liability verdict because the factfinder was not instructed to consider comparative causation despite evidence that Webb’s conduct contributed to the accident, and it remanded while leaving unresolved broader doctrinal details due to the fragmented opinions.