## Facts

- Ruby V. Weber (later Ruby V. Moos) and Herbert Weber married on September 13, 1995.
- Twenty-seven days after the marriage, Ruby retained counsel to begin divorce proceedings.
- On October 12, 1995, the parties met with Ruby’s attorney and signed a property settlement agreement drafted by Ruby’s counsel.
- As part of the agreement, Herbert signed a quitclaim deed conveying to Ruby a condominium worth about $70,000 that Herbert had owned before the marriage.
- The agreement and related documents were filed on October 16, 1995; that same day Herbert obtained counsel and moved to set aside the agreement and deed.
- The district court initially denied relief, finding Herbert could act independently and there was no mistake, fraud, or undue duress.
- On a first appeal, the Supreme Court remanded because the district court had not addressed unconscionability.
- On remand, the district court found the agreement unconscionable, vacated it in full, and set aside the quitclaim deed.
- Ruby appealed from the judgment on remand.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court erred in finding the marital property settlement agreement and related quitclaim deed unconscionable and vacating them.
2. Whether, in a divorce proceeding, an agreement may be invalidated as unconscionable based on substantive unfairness even without fraud, duress, mistake, or incapacity.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
- The Court held the district court properly applied the required unconscionability review on remand.
- The Court upheld the finding that the agreement’s terms were substantively one-sided and imposed hardship on Herbert, particularly given the extremely short marriage and the transfer of significant premarital property.
- The Court concluded the district court’s findings were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous.
- The property settlement agreement and the quitclaim deed were vacated in their entirety.

## Legal Principles

- Marital property settlement agreements are favored, but a divorce court must independently ensure the property division is “just and proper” and may refuse to enforce an agreement that fails that fairness requirement.
- Unconscionability includes procedural and substantive components; substantive unconscionability focuses on whether terms are so one-sided or oppressive that enforcement would be unfair.
- In divorce cases, the absence of fraud, duress, mistake, or incapacity does not bar a court from setting aside an agreement that is substantively unconscionable when measured against the equitable distribution result expected without an agreement.
- Whether an agreement is unconscionable is fact-dependent; appellate review defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed vacatur of a marital settlement agreement and a quitclaim deed where, despite voluntary execution and no traditional contract defects, the agreement’s substantive terms were markedly one-sided and unfair in light of the parties’ brief marriage and the transfer of substantial premarital property.


Weber v. Weber, 589 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1999)