## Facts

- Lorna T. Oakley executed a 30-year mortgage note and deed on a condominium for $70,000 with monthly payments of $495.46.
- The mortgage contained an optional acceleration clause and a nonwaiver clause stating that lender forbearance would not waive any rights or remedies.
- Oakley developed serious psychiatric disabilities, left work on unpaid medical leave in March 1999, and defaulted by September 1999 (arrears of $2,885.32; payments past due since June 1999).
- On September 13, 1999, the bank sent a default-and-cure notice giving Oakley until October 13 to cure and warning that failure to pay would accelerate the full balance.
- On October 14, 1999, the bank sent a letter stating that the payment was not received, the bank considered the debt accelerated, and the matter was referred to counsel.
- On October 19, 1999, the bank’s attorney sent a letter offering an additional opportunity to cure by October 27, warning foreclosure could follow, and stating the letter did not waive any rights under the mortgage documents.
- Oakley did not cure, and the bank filed an action for strict foreclosure and related relief on November 17, 1999.
- Oakley asserted defenses that acceleration was not clearly and unequivocally invoked and that disability statutes required the bank to accommodate her by adjusting payment obligations rather than foreclosing.
- The trial court granted summary judgment of strict foreclosure for the bank.

## Issues

1. Whether the lender clearly and unequivocally exercised its option to accelerate the mortgage debt despite a later attorney letter offering a further cure opportunity.
2. Whether the ADA, the FHAA, or Connecticut fair housing statutes require a mortgagee to accommodate a disabled mortgagor’s inability to pay by modifying payment terms or refraining from foreclosure.

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of strict foreclosure.
- The October 14 letter was a clear and unequivocal exercise of the acceleration option after the cure deadline passed.
- The October 19 attorney letter did not rescind acceleration; it offered additional time to cure while expressly preserving the lender’s rights, consistent with the mortgage’s nonwaiver clause.
- Disability discrimination statutes did not require the bank to modify or suspend the borrower’s payment obligation or to forgo foreclosure due to disability-related inability to pay.

## Legal Principles

- When a mortgage provides an optional acceleration remedy, the mortgagee must communicate exercise of that option clearly and unequivocally.
- A notice stating the lender considers the debt accelerated after an unmet cure deadline can satisfy the clear-and-unequivocal requirement.
- A subsequent offer of additional time to cure does not, by itself, undo acceleration where the lender preserves rights and a nonwaiver clause provides that forbearance is not a waiver.
- The ADA, the FHAA, and state fair housing statutes’ reasonable-accommodation requirements do not obligate a lender to alter the essential economic terms of a mortgage or to refrain from foreclosure when the borrower fails to make required payments, even if the default is tied to disability.

## Conclusion

The court upheld strict foreclosure because the bank effectively accelerated the debt through clear notice, and the later cure offer did not waive or retract that acceleration under the nonwaiver clause; it also held that disability and fair housing laws do not require lenders to restructure mortgage payment obligations or withhold foreclosure as an accommodation for a borrower’s disability-related inability to pay.


Webster Bank v. Oakley, 830 A.2d 139 (Conn. 2003)