## Facts

- Lonnie Weeks, Jr. was convicted in Virginia of capital murder for shooting Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos after a traffic stop involving a stolen vehicle.
- At the penalty phase, the prosecution sought a death sentence based on statutory aggravators of future dangerousness and that the offense was vile or inhuman; the defense presented mitigation witnesses.
- The jury was instructed that if it unanimously found an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, it *may* impose death, but if, from all the evidence, it believed death was not justified, it *shall* impose life imprisonment.
- During deliberations, the jury asked whether a life sentence included parole eligibility; the judge responded without directly answering the parole question.
- The jury later asked whether, upon finding at least one aggravating circumstance, it had a duty to impose death or could choose between death and life.
- The trial judge responded by directing jurors back to the relevant paragraph of the existing instructions stating they *may* impose death or must impose life if death was not justified from all the evidence.
- Defense counsel requested an additional clarifying instruction expressly stating the jury could impose life even after finding an aggravator; the judge refused.
- The jury returned a death sentence, stating it found an aggravating circumstance and had considered mitigation.

## Issues

1. Whether the Constitution is violated when a trial judge answers a capital jury’s question about whether death is required upon finding an aggravator by referring the jury back to a paragraph of otherwise adequate instructions rather than giving a further clarifying instruction.
2. Whether Weeks was entitled to federal habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the penalty-phase instructions and jury questions.
3. Whether AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), barred relief because the state courts’ decisions were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief.
- Referring the jury back to a specific paragraph of constitutionally sufficient sentencing instructions, in response to the jury’s question, did not violate the Constitution.
- Under AEDPA, the Virginia Supreme Court’s approval of the instructions and the trial court’s response was not contrary to, and did not unreasonably apply, clearly established federal law.
- The state court’s rejection of Weeks’s ineffective-assistance claims was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.

## Legal Principles

- The Eighth Amendment requires that a capital sentencer not be precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence; no specific “magic words” or particular instruction format is required if the charge adequately permits mitigation consideration.
- A jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions; when instructions already correctly state the law, a judge may respond to a jury question by directing attention to the pertinent portion.
- On federal habeas review, AEDPA permits relief only if the state court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
- Ineffective assistance claims on habeas require showing deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland, and AEDPA further limits relief to unreasonable state-court applications of that standard.

## Conclusion

The Court held that, in a capital case, a judge may constitutionally address a jury’s question about whether death is mandatory after finding an aggravator by pointing the jury to a clear, existing instruction preserving discretion to impose life, and that AEDPA required deference to the state courts’ approval of that approach and their rejection of related ineffective-assistance claims.


Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000)