## Facts

- Weight-Rite Golf Corporation and an affiliated entity manufactured and distributed a golf shoe with a heel-elevating feature intended to aid weight distribution during a golf swing.
- The United States Golf Association (USGA) interprets and applies the Rules of Golf in the United States (alongside the R&A).
- In March 1990, the USGA determined the Weight-Rite shoe did not conform to Rule 14-3 (prohibiting certain artificial devices and unusual equipment) because it assisted the player’s swing beyond ordinary footwear.
- After the nonconformance determination, retailers allegedly stopped selling the shoe and returned inventory due to concerns about tournament legality and customer demand.
- Weight-Rite sued seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging Sherman Act § 1 restraint-of-trade/conspiracy, Sherman Act § 2 monopolization/attempted monopolization, Florida Antitrust Act violations, and state-law slander and intentional interference with business relationships.
- Weight-Rite argued the USGA effectively compelled member clubs and tournaments to enforce the ruling, relying mainly on (a) scorecard language stating “USGA rules govern all play” and (b) a bylaw stating members “must accept and enforce all rules.”
- Weight-Rite relied heavily on an expert affidavit (Kursh) to support market effects; the USGA moved to strike the affidavit and sought summary judgment on all claims.

## Issues

1. Whether the record contained sufficient evidence of a “contract, combination, or conspiracy” under Sherman Act § 1, as opposed to unilateral action by the USGA.
2. Whether plaintiffs produced competent evidence of a relevant market, USGA market power, and anticompetitive effects sufficient to show an unreasonable restraint of trade under federal and Florida antitrust law.
3. Whether plaintiffs established monopoly power and exclusionary conduct to support monopolization or attempted monopolization under Sherman Act § 2.
4. Whether the expert affidavit should be stricken under Rules 26(e) and 56(e) and, if not, what probative value it had at summary judgment.
5. Whether the evidence supported the elements of slander and intentional interference with business relationships, including falsity, improper conduct, and causation.

## Decision

- The court denied the motion to strike the Kursh expert affidavit as untimely, finding the disclosure complied with the scheduling order.
- The court granted the USGA’s motion for summary judgment on all antitrust claims.
- The court held plaintiffs failed to show concerted action for Sherman Act § 1; the USGA’s nonconformance ruling was unilateral conduct on this record.
- The court held plaintiffs failed to produce nonconclusory evidence of market definition, market power, or anticompetitive effects; the expert affidavit lacked supporting data.
- The court granted summary judgment on the Sherman Act § 2 claim for failure to show monopoly power in a properly defined market and exclusionary conduct.
- The court granted summary judgment on Florida antitrust claims, applying the same analysis as federal antitrust law.
- The court granted summary judgment on slander and intentional interference claims due to insufficient proof of false factual statements, improper conduct, and causation.

## Legal Principles

- Sherman Act § 1 liability requires evidence of concerted action; unilateral rule interpretation or announcement by an organization is insufficient without proof of agreement or coordinated enforcement.
- Ambiguous governance materials (e.g., general scorecard language or bylaw phrasing) do not establish an agreement when the documents, read in context, do not mandate the alleged enforcement conduct.
- At summary judgment, antitrust plaintiffs must present competent evidence on relevant market, market power, and anticompetitive effects; conclusory expert assertions unsupported by facts or data do not create a genuine issue of material fact.
- Sherman Act § 2 requires proof of monopoly power in a defined market plus exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct; regulatory influence over rules of play, without more, does not establish monopoly power as an economic actor.
- A governing body’s good-faith communication of an equipment-conformance interpretation, absent falsity or improper means, does not support slander or tortious interference on an undeveloped record of causation and wrongdoing.

## Conclusion

The court entered judgment for the USGA, holding that plaintiffs’ challenge to the nonconforming-equipment determination failed because the record did not show an antitrust agreement or substantiated market harm and did not support state-law tort elements tied to the ruling’s publication and alleged business fallout.


Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. United States Golf Ass'n, 766 F. Supp. 1104 (M.D. Fla. 1991)