## Facts

- Beth Weinstein was employed by St. Mary’s Medical Center.
- On October 14, 1994, she suffered a work-related left-foot injury, used crutches, and received workers’ compensation benefits.
- On January 10, 1995, while still being treated for the earlier injury, she returned to the hospital to receive medical treatment for her left foot.
- While being escorted through a hospital hallway, she slipped on a wet substance and fell, aggravating her prior injury.
- The hospital later laid her off due to downsizing, and its workers’ compensation carrier continued paying for treatment related to the January 10 injury.
- Weinstein filed a civil premises-liability action alleging the hospital, as landowner, failed to maintain reasonably safe premises.

## Issues

1. Whether workers’ compensation exclusivity barred Weinstein’s tort claim for a slip-and-fall occurring on the employer’s premises while she was present for medical treatment for a prior industrial injury.
2. Whether the hospital, as summary judgment movant, established that the Labor Code section 3600 “conditions of compensation” existed at the time of the January 10 injury (including that it arose out of and occurred in the course of employment).
3. Whether Weinstein stated a prima facie common-law premises-liability claim based on the hospital’s duty as a landowner to an invitee.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment for the hospital.
- The hospital did not meet its summary judgment burden to establish a complete defense based on workers’ compensation exclusivity.
- The record did not conclusively show that, at the time of the January 10 injury, the statutory “conditions of compensation” under Labor Code section 3600 were satisfied.
- Weinstein’s complaint stated a prima facie premises-liability cause of action based on the hospital’s common-law duty as landowner to an invitee.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy only when the statutory “conditions of compensation” under Labor Code section 3600 exist at the time of injury, including that the injury arises out of and occurs in the course of employment.
- Exclusivity turns on the origin of the duty allegedly breached at the time of injury: if the duty arises from the employment relationship, workers’ compensation generally applies; if the duty arises independently under common law, a tort action may proceed.
- An employer may owe employees multiple duties (statutory duties as an employer and independent common-law duties such as those of a landowner to an invitee); only the former are subject to exclusivity.
- On summary judgment, the employer bears the burden to establish the facts necessary to prove workers’ compensation exclusivity as a complete defense; failure to establish the section 3600 conditions defeats the motion.

## Conclusion

The court held that the hospital failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Weinstein’s slip-and-fall while at the hospital for treatment occurred under the Labor Code section 3600 conditions of compensation, so workers’ compensation exclusivity did not bar her common-law premises-liability claim.


Weinstein v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., 58 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 461 (Ct. App. 1997)