## Facts

- Shelley Weinstock was an assistant professor of chemistry at Barnard College from 1985 to 1994 and became eligible for tenure in the 1992–93 academic year.
- Barnard and Columbia used a multi-level tenure review process involving votes and recommendations from Barnard and Columbia committees and administrators, including a Columbia Provost-appointed ad hoc committee.
- The Barnard Chemistry Department, Barnard’s appointments/tenure committee, and the Columbia Chemistry Department voted in favor of tenure.
- Barnard’s President expressed reservations about Weinstock’s scholarship but forwarded the case to Columbia for further review.
- A Columbia ad hoc committee reviewed Weinstock’s tenure file and recommended against tenure based on concerns about the quality, impact, and quantity of her scholarship.
- The Columbia Provost accepted the ad hoc committee’s recommendation, and tenure was denied.
- Weinstock alleged the denial resulted from sex discrimination, citing favorable internal votes, alleged disparate treatment of male comparators, alleged biased comments or conduct, and alleged procedural irregularities.
- Columbia maintained the decision rested on academic judgment regarding Weinstock’s scholarly record rather than sex.

## Issues

1. Whether Weinstock presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Columbia’s stated academic reasons for denying tenure were false and that sex discrimination was the real reason under Title VII.
2. How the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies at summary judgment in the context of an academic tenure decision requiring deference to academic judgment.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Columbia.
- The court assumed Weinstock established a prima facie case and held Columbia articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons grounded in academic evaluation of scholarship.
- The court held Weinstock failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find pretext and discriminatory intent, rather than disagreement with academic judgments or dissatisfaction with the process.
- A dissent would have allowed the case to proceed to a jury based on the record viewed favorably to Weinstock.

## Legal Principles

- Under McDonnell Douglas/Burdine, after a prima facie showing and an employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff must produce evidence permitting a jury to find the reason is false and discrimination is the real motive.
- At summary judgment, conclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation do not create a triable issue of discriminatory intent.
- Courts give substantial deference to universities’ academic judgments in tenure decisions and will not act as a super-tenure review body absent evidence that the stated academic reasons mask unlawful discrimination.
- Favorable recommendations at earlier stages, disagreement among evaluators, or evidence that another reviewer might have reached a different academic conclusion does not, without more, prove pretext.

## Conclusion

The court held that Title VII applies to tenure decisions but affirmed summary judgment because Weinstock’s evidence did not permit a reasonable inference that Columbia’s articulated academic criticisms were a cover for sex discrimination.


Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000)