## Facts

- Naftali Weisberger (father) and Chava Weisberger (mother) divorced and had three children.
- The divorce settlement provided for joint custody, with the mother as the children’s primary physical custodian.
- The agreement included a religious-upbringing clause stating that the children would be raised in accordance with Hasidic practices, and it gave the father the right to choose the children’s school.
- The agreement required the father to pay child support, but he did not pay it.
- The father also did not fully use the visitation time available to him under the agreement.
- About three years after the divorce, the father moved to modify the custodial arrangement and to enforce the religious-upbringing clause, claiming the mother violated (or permitted the children to violate) Hasidic practices in multiple ways, including:
  - the children’s dress,
  - eating non-kosher food,
  - cutting the children’s hair, and
  - the children speaking English in school.
- The father sought sole custody and specific enforcement of the religious clause.
- Trial testimony indicated that the mother had the closest relationship with the children.
- The Supreme Court awarded the father sole legal and residential custody and limited the mother to supervised visitation.
- In reaching that result, the Supreme Court treated the parties’ original religious-upbringing agreement as the key factor and concluded that the agreement required the mother to practice Hasidic Judaism in front of the children.
- The mother appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by changing custody and restricting the mother to supervised visitation based primarily on enforcing the parties’ religious-upbringing agreement, rather than a full best-interests analysis.
2. Whether a religious-upbringing clause may be enforced in a way that effectively compels a parent’s personal religious conduct as a condition of custody or visitation.
3. Whether, absent proof that the mother’s conduct harmed the children, the court could impose religiously based restrictions on the mother’s parenting time.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division reversed the custody and visitation provisions appealed from.
- The Appellate Division held that the trial court improperly treated the religious-upbringing clause as determinative in the custody analysis instead of applying the best-interests-of-the-child standard.
- The Appellate Division rejected enforcing the agreement in a manner that required the mother to engage in Hasidic religious practice herself as a condition of parenting time.
- The matter was remitted for further proceedings to determine custody and access under the proper best-interests framework, without imposing coercive religious conditions absent a welfare-based justification.

## Legal Principles

- Custody and visitation determinations must be made under the best interests of the child; private custody terms remain subject to judicial review and modification.
- A parental agreement about a child’s religious upbringing may be considered, but it is not controlling where it conflicts with the child’s welfare as found under the best-interests standard.
- Courts must remain neutral on questions of religion and may not use custody orders to pressure a parent to engage in religious observance.
- Limits on a parent’s access—such as supervised visitation or conditions tied to religious conduct—require a record-based showing that the restriction is necessary to protect the child’s welfare, not merely that a parent departed from agreed religious practices.
- In deciding best interests, courts may consider the totality of circumstances shown in the record, including each parent’s past caregiving role and the practical realities of support and visitation.

## Conclusion

Weisberger v. Weisberger holds that custody cannot be shifted and a parent’s access cannot be sharply restricted simply to enforce a Hasidic-upbringing clause; the controlling inquiry remains the children’s best interests, and courts may not impose conditions that effectively force a parent’s personal religious practice absent a demonstrated need tied to the children’s welfare.


Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265 (2017)