## Facts

- Cheryl Wells brought a wrongful-death action after her 12-year-old son, D.E., was beaten to death by 15-year-old L.H. in woods behind L.H.’s grandparents’ home.
- L.H. lived with his mother, Gloria Hickman, in a trailer on the grandparents’ land within about 100 feet of the grandparents’ house and frequently spent time at their home.
- Hickman worked nights and typically left for work around 10:00 p.m.; the grandparents regularly cared for L.H. while Hickman worked, and L.H. often ate meals and snacks at their home.
- Either Hickman or the grandparents generally knew L.H.’s whereabouts.
- Before the killing, L.H. had engaged in troubling conduct, including killing a pet dog by beating it to death and killing a pet hamster; there was also evidence of a school fight and suicidal statements.
- L.H. and D.E. had played together without incident in the past.
- Wells alleged Hickman and the grandparents knew or should have known of L.H.’s dangerous propensities and negligently failed to control him or protect D.E.

## Issues

1. Whether Indiana Code § 34-4-31-1, which caps a parent’s statutory liability for a child’s wrongful acts at $3,000, precludes a common-law negligence claim based on the parent’s own negligent supervision or failure to control the child.
2. Whether Hickman owed a common-law duty to exercise reasonable care to control L.H. for the safety of D.E., including whether the fatal assault was reasonably foreseeable.
3. Whether the grandparents owed a duty to control L.H. or to protect D.E. from L.H.’s criminal act under the circumstances.

## Decision

- The court held the statutory cap in Indiana Code § 34-4-31-1 does not bar a plaintiff from pursuing common-law negligence based on a parent’s own conduct.
- The court nevertheless affirmed summary judgment for Hickman because, on the undisputed facts, the fatal beating of D.E. was not reasonably foreseeable, so no duty arose to prevent that harm.
- The court reversed the denial of summary judgment for the grandparents and directed judgment for them because they owed no duty to control L.H. or protect D.E. on these facts.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.

## Legal Principles

- A statutory scheme imposing limited, derivative parental liability for a child’s wrongful acts does not eliminate separate common-law negligence claims premised on the parent’s own acts or omissions.
- Duty in negligence may depend on whether the type of harm was reasonably foreseeable; when the harm is not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law, no duty arises.
- Absent a special relationship and a reasonably foreseeable risk to others, a person generally has no duty to control a third party’s conduct or to protect another from a third party’s criminal act.
- Regular caregiving or proximity to a child does not, by itself, create an affirmative duty to protect third parties from the child’s unforeseeable violent criminal act.

## Conclusion

The court ruled that Indiana’s capped statutory parental-liability provision does not displace common-law negligence claims, but it held that neither the mother nor the grandparents owed a duty to prevent the child’s lethal assault because that harm was not reasonably foreseeable; summary judgment ultimately was proper for all defendants.


Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)