## Facts

- James Welsh worked for John Cornell on a construction operation involving a guy rope secured by metal clamps.
- While Welsh was working under or near the guy rope, a clamp broke and fell, striking Welsh and causing serious injuries.
- Welsh lacked direct evidence identifying a specific negligent act by Cornell because the injury resulted from a sudden mechanical failure.
- Welsh presented expert testimony that a properly made and used clamp would not ordinarily break as it did, and that such a break would occur only if the clamp was defective (e.g., unsuitable, improperly selected, or inadequately inspected/maintained).
- The condition and behavior of the clamp in the accident formed the basis of Welsh’s circumstantial proof.

## Issues

1. Whether circumstantial evidence, including expert testimony that the clamp would not have broken absent defect, was sufficient to allow a jury to infer employer negligence.
2. Whether the trial court properly dismissed the complaint as a matter of law for failure to prove negligence without direct evidence of a specific negligent act.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the intermediate appellate court’s order reversing the trial-level dismissal and granting a new trial.
- The court held that the evidence permitted a reasonable inference of negligence and therefore required submission to the jury.
- The trial court erred by withdrawing the case from the jury based solely on the absence of direct proof of the precise negligent act.

## Legal Principles

- An employer has a duty to provide employees with reasonably safe appliances and to exercise reasonable care in their selection, inspection, and maintenance.
- A plaintiff may prove negligence by circumstantial evidence; direct proof of the exact negligent act is not required if the circumstances support a reasonable inference of negligence.
- Unexplained failure of equipment under the defendant’s responsibility, combined with expert testimony that such failure does not ordinarily occur absent defect or lack of due care, can be sufficient to reach the jury (functionally consistent with res ipsa loquitur reasoning).

## Conclusion

Because the clamp’s unexpected breaking and falling, explained by expert testimony as an event that would not occur without defect, supported an inference that the employer failed to provide a reasonably safe appliance, the negligence claim could not be dismissed as a matter of law and had to be tried to a jury.


Welsh v. Cornell, 168 N.Y. 508, 61 N.E. 891 (N.Y. 1901)