Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002)

Facts

  • Florida residents bought short-term, high-interest promissory notes issued by K.D. Trinh Investments, Inc., a Canadian company, through Florida-based independent agents, including Bernard Wendt.
  • Investors sued Wendt in a Florida class action, alleging the notes were worthless and violated Florida securities laws.
  • Wendt filed a third-party complaint against Marvin Horowitz and his Michigan law firm, alleging negligent legal advice and related conduct caused Wendt’s exposure to liability.
  • K.D. Trinh retained Horowitz (in Michigan) to advise on U.S. securities matters, including Florida.
  • Wendt alleged Horowitz advised that the notes were not securities under Florida law and that the agents did not need Florida securities licenses.
  • During a Florida regulatory investigation, Horowitz—while remaining outside Florida—communicated in writing with Florida regulators and acted on K.D. Trinh’s behalf.
  • Wendt alleged Horowitz negligently drafted loan documents intended for Florida transactions and negligently communicated with Florida regulators, causing harm in Florida.

Issues

  1. Whether a nonresident “commits a tortious act within” Florida under § 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by directing telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida when the alleged tort arises from those communications.
  2. Whether physical presence in Florida is required to satisfy the “tortious act” prong of Florida’s long-arm statute.

Decision

  • The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court decision that had rejected jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings.
  • The Court held that “committing a tortious act” in Florida under § 48.193(1)(b) can be satisfied by telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida, if the cause of action arises from those communications.
  • The Court clarified that the statutory long-arm analysis is separate from the constitutional due process analysis, which must still be addressed on remand.
  • The Court did not decide whether in-state injury alone (without qualifying communications) is sufficient under § 48.193(1)(b).
  • Physical presence in Florida is not required for a nonresident to commit a tortious act in Florida for purposes of § 48.193(1)(b).
  • A nonresident satisfies § 48.193(1)(b) when the alleged tort arises from telephonic, electronic, or written communications purposefully directed into Florida.
  • Personal jurisdiction requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether the long-arm statute applies, and (2) whether exercising jurisdiction satisfies due process (minimum contacts and fair play).

Conclusion

Florida’s long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose allegedly tortious conduct consists of communications directed into Florida, so long as the claim arises from those communications; the case was remanded for further proceedings, including any due process evaluation.