## Facts

- James and Yvonne Wessels were married for 21 years. Early in the marriage, Yvonne worked as a nurse while James completed medical school.
- After their children were born, Yvonne became the primary homemaker and caregiver, and James pursued his medical career as the family’s main wage earner.
- In May 1986, the parties’ dissolution decree incorporated a stipulation requiring James to pay Yvonne $3,100 per month in rehabilitative alimony for 60 months.
- The stipulation also provided up to $700 per month for up to two years if Yvonne attended a full-time postgraduate program.
- The decree conditioned the time-limited support on Yvonne making every reasonable effort to become self-sufficient and expressly characterized the alimony as rehabilitative.
- Around the time of the dissolution, Yvonne had begun experiencing psychiatric problems and sought treatment.
- In the years following the divorce, Yvonne’s condition worsened. She was diagnosed with major depression and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder.
- Yvonne made repeated efforts to work and move toward self-support, but she was unable to maintain employment due to her psychiatric condition.
- About one month before the rehabilitative alimony was set to end, Yvonne filed an application to modify the decree, seeking an extension of rehabilitative alimony or conversion to permanent alimony.
- After trial, the district court found unforeseen changed circumstances and modified the decree by converting the award to permanent alimony at the same monthly amount.
- The district court also ordered that the alimony payments be held in trust for Yvonne’s benefit rather than paid directly to her.
- James appealed the conversion of rehabilitative alimony to permanent alimony, and Yvonne cross-appealed the trust requirement.

## Issues

1. May rehabilitative alimony set to terminate on a date certain be extended and made permanent upon proof of unforeseen, substantial, and lasting changed circumstances?
2. May a dissolution court require alimony payments to be held in trust against the recipient’s wishes without statutory authority, agreement, or a proper protective proceeding?

## Decision

- Yes. The Iowa Supreme Court held that, in extreme circumstances, rehabilitative alimony can be modified, extended, and effectively made permanent when the statutory modification standard is met.
- The court affirmed the district court’s modification converting Yvonne’s time-limited rehabilitative alimony to permanent alimony because her serious and lasting mental-health deterioration prevented the contemplated self-sufficiency.
- No. The court held the district court lacked authority on this record to place alimony payments in trust over Yvonne’s objection.
- Disposition: affirmed on James’s appeal; reversed on Yvonne’s cross-appeal.

## Legal Principles

- A dissolution decree’s support provisions may be modified upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances that was not within the parties’ contemplation at the time of the decree and is more or less permanent.
- Rehabilitative alimony, even when expressly designated and time-limited, remains subject to modification under Iowa’s general modification standards.
- When unforeseen, lasting disability or similar extreme circumstances prevent a recipient from achieving the expected self-support during the rehabilitative term, a court may extend rehabilitative alimony and may convert it to permanent alimony.
- A dissolution court may not control a competent alimony recipient’s use of support by ordering payments held in trust over the recipient’s objection absent legal authority such as statute, stipulation, or a properly invoked guardianship or conservatorship process.

## Conclusion

Wessels v. Wessels holds that Iowa courts may modify a fixed-term rehabilitative alimony award and convert it to permanent alimony when unforeseen, enduring mental illness prevents the recipient from becoming self-sufficient, but the court may not require alimony to be paid into a trust against the recipient’s wishes without a valid legal basis.


Wessels v. Wessels, 542 N.W.2d 486 (1995)