## Facts

- Chapel Hill Police Department officers responded to a 911 call reporting a hostage situation at an apartment occupied by William K. White and his then fiancée, Rhonda Allen; both had histories of mental illness and substance abuse.
- Allen was outside when officers arrived and spoke with James Hugerich, the police crisis-unit supervisor and trained negotiator.
- Allen gave Hugerich journal notes she said were White’s, describing suicidal and homicidal thoughts; Hugerich read statements indicating White wanted to “blow away” certain people and could “blow his brains all over the wall,” and suggesting he was dangerous to others.
- Allen told Hugerich that White had a .44-caliber revolver.
- Officers treated the incident as a high-risk standoff and negotiated with White for nearly six hours.
- Police eventually secured White and recovered the revolver; White was taken to the emergency room and involuntarily committed for psychiatric evaluation.
- White sued the Town of Chapel Hill, the police chief, a captain, and other officers (named and/or as John Does), asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and multiple North Carolina tort claims.
- Among his state-law claims, White alleged officers defamed him by speaking to the press and describing him as a “gunman” in connection with the incident.
- White contended “gunman” was false because he did not brandish or display the firearm; he alleged reputational harm but no specific, quantifiable damages tied to the statements.

## Issues

1. Whether the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity on White’s § 1983 claims arising from the seizure, disarming, and events leading to his involuntary commitment.
2. Whether the Town of Chapel Hill could be liable under § 1983 based on an official policy or custom (or a failure to train or supervise) that caused a constitutional violation.
3. Whether calling White a “gunman” in statements to the press was actionable slander under North Carolina law, including whether the statement was materially false and whether White could recover without proof of special damages.
4. Whether White’s remaining state-law tort claims could survive summary judgment in light of the evidentiary record and applicable governmental or public-official defenses.

## Decision

- The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on all federal and state claims.
- The individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, based on the information available at the time (hostage report, journal notes reflecting threats and suicidality, and a report that White had a .44-caliber revolver), their actions were objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established federal rights.
- The Town was not liable under § 1983 because White did not produce evidence that a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional injury, and the record did not support a deliberate-indifference failure-to-train theory.
- The slander claim failed because the “gunman” description was not actionable on this record: in context, the characterization was at least substantially true given the report and recovery of an armed weapon during a standoff, and White did not show legally recoverable damages.
- The court also rejected the remaining state-law claims at summary judgment because the record did not support the required elements and because immunity defenses barred recovery to the extent the claims were asserted against the Town or officers acting within the scope of their duties.

## Legal Principles

- Qualified immunity protects officers from § 1983 liability unless a plaintiff shows both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time; the inquiry turns on the objective reasonableness of the officers’ actions in light of the facts they reasonably perceived.
- A municipality is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for employees’ acts; liability requires proof that an official policy or custom (or a failure to train or supervise amounting to deliberate indifference) caused the alleged constitutional violation.
- Under North Carolina defamation law, substantial truth is a complete defense; a statement is not defamatory if the gist of what was communicated is true even if details are imperfect.
- North Carolina slander generally requires proof of actual damages unless the statement falls within a recognized per se category; generalized reputational injury without supporting proof may be insufficient at summary judgment depending on the alleged statement and context.
- Governmental immunity and related state-law defenses can bar tort claims against a municipality and, in some circumstances, against officers for conduct within their official duties absent evidence that would defeat those defenses.

## Conclusion

The court entered judgment for the Town of Chapel Hill and the officers, holding that the police response to a reported armed hostage situation—followed by disarming White and arranging emergency evaluation and involuntary commitment—did not defeat qualified immunity or support municipal § 1983 liability, and that the officers’ public “gunman” description was not actionable slander on the record presented.


White v. Town of Chapel Hill, 899 F. Supp. 1428 (1995)