Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007)

Facts

  • Marvin Howard Bockting was charged and convicted in Nevada state court of sexually assaulting his six-year-old stepdaughter.
  • The child gave detailed statements to a police detective, with the child’s mother present, describing the assaults.
  • After a pretrial hearing, the trial judge found the child too distressed to be sworn and therefore unavailable to testify.
  • Under a Nevada statute allowing certain child-victim hearsay if accompanied by guarantees of trustworthiness, the court admitted the mother’s and detective’s testimony recounting the child’s statements.
  • The admission was upheld under then-controlling federal Confrontation Clause doctrine permitting certain hearsay from unavailable witnesses if sufficiently reliable.
  • Bockting received two consecutive life sentences plus another concurrent life term.
  • After his conviction became final, the Supreme Court revised Confrontation Clause doctrine for “testimonial” hearsay, requiring unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
  • On federal habeas review, the Ninth Circuit held this revised doctrine applied retroactively as a “watershed” rule and granted relief.

Issues

  1. Whether the Confrontation Clause rule announced in Crawford v. Washington applies retroactively on collateral review under Teague v. Lane as a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit.
  • The Court held Crawford announced a “new” rule for Teague purposes.
  • The Court held Crawford is procedural, not substantive.
  • The Court held Crawford is not a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure and therefore does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.
  • Under Teague v. Lane, “new” rules generally do not apply retroactively on collateral review, subject to limited exceptions.
  • A rule is “new” if it was not dictated by precedent when the conviction became final; overruling prior doctrine strongly indicates newness.
  • Substantive rules (changing the scope of criminal liability or placing conduct/persons beyond punishment) may apply retroactively; rules governing the admissibility of evidence and trial procedures are procedural.
  • The “watershed” exception is exceptionally narrow; a qualifying rule must both (1) be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of inaccurate convictions and (2) constitute a bedrock procedural element essential to fundamental fairness.
  • Changes to Confrontation Clause doctrine, even significant ones, do not qualify as watershed absent a showing of a major, demonstrated improvement in trial accuracy and a transformation comparable to the right to counsel.

Conclusion

The Court held that Crawford’s testimonial-hearsay confrontation requirement is a new procedural rule that is neither substantive nor “watershed” under Teague, so it does not apply retroactively to reopen convictions final before Crawford on federal habeas review.