Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)

Facts

  • Kevin Wiggins was convicted in Maryland of capital murder in 1989 and elected jury sentencing.
  • Defense counsel sought to structure sentencing to first dispute whether Wiggins was the actual killer and to present mitigation only if necessary.
  • Counsel told the jury it would hear about Wiggins’s “difficult life,” but presented no mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.
  • Counsel’s mitigation investigation relied primarily on a presentence investigation, a psychological report, and limited social-services records, without pursuing indications of abuse and instability.
  • State funding was available to develop a comprehensive social history, but counsel did not secure such an investigation.
  • In state postconviction proceedings, new counsel presented detailed evidence that Wiggins suffered severe physical and sexual abuse, repeated foster placements, neglect, abandonment, and homelessness.
  • State courts denied relief, treating trial counsel’s penalty-phase choices as a reasonable strategy.
  • A federal district court granted habeas relief; the Fourth Circuit reversed; the Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

  1. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at capital sentencing by failing to investigate and present readily available mitigation evidence, under Strickland’s performance and prejudice standards.
  2. Whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the state court’s rejection of the ineffective-assistance claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that counsel’s sentencing performance violated the Sixth Amendment.
  • The Court found deficient performance because counsel’s mitigation investigation was inadequate under prevailing professional norms and did not reasonably support the decision to forgo a mitigation presentation.
  • The Court found prejudice because there was a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have chosen a different sentence if the jury had heard the substantial mitigation evidence.
  • The Court concluded that the state court’s contrary ruling was an unreasonable application of Strickland under AEDPA.
  • Effective capital representation requires a reasonable investigation into mitigating evidence or a reasonable, informed decision that further investigation is unnecessary.
  • Deference to “strategic” choices applies only when the choice is grounded in an adequate investigation of the relevant facts and options.
  • Prevailing professional norms, including the ABA Guidelines for capital defense, may be used as guidance in assessing reasonableness of counsel’s performance.
  • Prejudice at capital sentencing may be shown where omitted mitigation is powerful and noncumulative and could reasonably affect the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, including by influencing a single juror.
  • On federal habeas review, relief is available when the state court unreasonably applies clearly established Supreme Court precedent, not merely when a federal court would decide differently.

Conclusion

The Court held that capital counsel’s failure to conduct a competent mitigation investigation and present compelling evidence of severe childhood abuse and deprivation constituted ineffective assistance, and that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in denying relief under AEDPA.