## Facts

- William Inglis & Sons Baking Co., a wholesale baking company, sued multiple competitors alleging antitrust and unfair-pricing violations in West Coast wholesale bread markets.
- Inglis sought a preliminary injunction limited to the Northern California market against five baking-company defendants.
- The motion focused on alleged discriminatory and below-cost pricing of “private label” bread, asserted to violate Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a) and the California Unfair Practices Act.
- Defendants argued their pricing was a good-faith effort to meet competition, asserting a “meeting competition” defense.
- The district court held extensive evidentiary proceedings (including cost studies) and denied preliminary relief.
- Inglis took an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an injunction.

## Issues

1. What legal standard governs issuance of a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, particularly the relationship between likelihood of success on the merits and the threatened harm to the movant?
2. Whether the district court applied an erroneously demanding probability-of-success requirement in denying preliminary injunctive relief.

## Decision

- The court of appeals vacated the order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded.
- The court held that the district court relied on an erroneous legal premise by effectively requiring a strong showing that Inglis would prevail on the merits.
- The court directed reconsideration under the Ninth Circuit’s flexible preliminary-injunction standard, which permits relief when serious harm is shown and the merits present at least serious questions.

## Legal Principles

- Appellate review of a preliminary injunction ruling is for abuse of discretion; reliance on an incorrect legal standard is reversible error.
- A preliminary injunction may issue under either of two alternative formulations:
  - A strong likelihood of success on the merits and a possibility of irreparable injury; or
  - Serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping sharply in the movant’s favor.
- The movant need not be “reasonably certain” to succeed on the merits; a lesser showing on the merits can suffice when threatened harm is sufficiently serious.
- Preliminary injunctions serve to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable injury pending trial; the merits are not finally resolved at the preliminary stage.
- Statutory “meeting competition” defenses may be relevant to merits assessment but do not justify imposing a rigid likelihood-of-success requirement at the preliminary-injunction stage.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit required application of a sliding-scale preliminary injunction test that allows interim relief when serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships strongly favors the movant, rejecting a standard that effectively demands likely success on the merits before any preliminary protection is granted.


William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975)