Williams Island Country Club, Inc. v. San Simeon at the California Club, Ltd., 454 So. 2d 23 (1984)

Facts

  • Prior to 1979, Sky Lake Development, Inc. owned both an 18-hole golf course and an adjacent development tract that included a narrow “entry strip.”
  • While Sky Lake owned both parcels, golfers and maintenance used a paved path running between the 13th and 14th holes, and the path crossed the entry strip.
  • There was no other practical or safe alternative route for golf carts traveling between the 13th and 14th holes.
  • Sky Lake sold the development tract and entry strip to an entity controlled by developer Harry Peisach.
  • The sales contract contemplated that the new owner would grant “certain reasonable easements for golf carts and maintenance,” but no express easement was ever granted or recorded.
  • Williams Island Country Club, Inc. later purchased the golf course and was told by Peisach that Williams had an easement across the entry strip for the golf-cart path.
  • Peisach then sold the development tract and entry strip to San Simeon at the California Club, Ltd.
  • Before purchasing, San Simeon was told of the claimed easement for the golf-cart path.
  • The parties failed to reach an agreement about continued use of the entry strip for the golf-cart path.
  • San Simeon bulldozed the path and blocked access over the entry strip.
  • Williams sued for a declaratory judgment that it held an easement by implication and sought a preliminary injunction to stop interference while the case was pending.
  • The trial court denied the preliminary injunction, and Williams appealed.

Issues

  1. Whether Williams made a sufficient showing that an easement by implication arose from a preexisting use of the entry strip for a golf-cart path, so that preliminary injunctive relief was warranted.
  2. Whether the lack of an express, recorded easement defeated interim injunctive relief when the claimed right was based on implication from prior use and the defendant had been told of the claimed easement before purchase.

Decision

  • The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District reversed the order denying the preliminary injunction.
  • The court held that Williams presented a prima facie case for an easement by implication based on the pre-severance, paved, and practically necessary golf-cart route across the entry strip.
  • The court remanded for entry of appropriate injunctive relief preserving the status quo pending final resolution of the easement claim.
  • An easement may be implied from a preexisting use when, before severance of common ownership, the owner used one part of the property for the benefit of another part in a manner that supports an inference the use would continue after severance.

  • The standard elements for an easement implied from prior use include:

    • unity of title before severance of the dominant and servient parcels;
    • a use that is apparent, continuous, and of a character indicating it was intended to be permanent; and
    • necessity sufficient to infer the parties expected the use to continue (in Florida, reasonable necessity, not absolute necessity).
  • Contract language and surrounding circumstances at severance may support an inference of intended continuation even when no express easement document is executed.

  • A purchaser who is told of a claimed easement, or otherwise has notice of the circumstances supporting it, is not insulated from an implied-easement claim merely because no easement was recorded.

  • In deciding a motion for preliminary injunction, courts consider whether the movant has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and the need to prevent irreparable harm and preserve the status quo pending final adjudication.

Conclusion

The Third District reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction because Williams showed that, under prior common ownership, a paved golf-cart path across the entry strip served the golf course and lacked any practical or safe alternative, the severance contract contemplated golf-cart and maintenance easements, and later purchasers—including San Simeon—were told of the claimed easement; these facts supported a prima facie easement by implication and justified interim relief to prevent continued obstruction.