Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (1985)

Facts

  • Shawn Stevensen Williams leased a third-floor apartment in the Cambridge Apartments owned by Kenneth O. and Charlotte B. Melby and related Melby entities.
  • The building had been constructed with the involvement of Herbert Trayner, a general contractor who selected the overall design, chose the mechanical engineer to draw plans, and approved the plans.
  • The apartment was designed with a mansard roof, causing the bedroom’s exterior wall to slope inward.
  • The bedroom window was vertical and protruded into the room; the glass portion of the window was about twenty-two inches above the floor.
  • Williams and her husband inspected the apartment before leasing it, but after moving in she realized the sloping wall required placement of their king-size bed so that a person getting up would be next to the window.
  • At about 2:30 a.m. on January 19, 1981, Williams awoke abruptly, became disoriented, stepped out of bed, stumbled into the low window area, and fell through the closed window to the ground three stories below.
  • Williams could not describe precisely how she went through the window; the fall broke her back and left her permanently paralyzed from the waist down.
  • In opposing summary judgment, Williams submitted a physician’s affidavit stating she likely experienced momentary dizziness and disorientation after waking, which probably contributed to the fall.
  • Williams also submitted an architect’s affidavit stating that the bedroom window design created an unreasonable risk to an occupant’s safety.
  • Williams sued the Melbys and Trayner-related defendants for negligent design, construction, and maintenance of the window and bedroom configuration; the trial court granted defendants summary judgment.

Issues

  1. Whether summary judgment was proper when evidence (including an architect’s affidavit) supported a finding that the low, protruding third-floor bedroom window and related room configuration posed an unreasonable risk of harm.
  2. Whether the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on duty and breach based on arguments such as obviousness of the condition and/or claimed compliance with minimum code requirements.
  3. Whether causation and Williams’s comparative fault (including her momentary disorientation upon waking) could be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment.

Decision

  • The Utah Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
  • The court held that the record contained genuine disputes of material fact on whether the window and bedroom design created an unreasonable risk and whether defendants failed to use reasonable care in design, construction, or maintenance.
  • The court rejected resolving the case as a matter of law based on the condition being visible or based on minimum code compliance; those points were evidence for the factfinder, not a complete defense on this record.
  • The court held that causation and comparative fault—including the role of momentary disorientation after waking—presented jury questions.
  • Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; negligence cases often require trial when reasonable factfinders could differ on breach or causation.
  • Landlords and those involved in designing and constructing residential premises may owe tenants a duty of reasonable care to avoid creating or maintaining unreasonable risks of physical harm.
  • Compliance with building codes may be evidence of reasonable care, but it does not automatically defeat a negligence claim where a factfinder could still find the condition unreasonably dangerous in context.
  • A dangerous condition’s visibility does not automatically eliminate liability; the reasonableness of the risk and the parties’ conduct may remain fact questions.
  • Comparative fault and proximate-cause determinations, including the effect of a plaintiff’s momentary disorientation, are typically for the trier of fact when competing inferences are supported by evidence.

Conclusion

Because Williams presented evidence that the third-floor bedroom window’s low height and protruding configuration—combined with the room layout placing the bed next to the window—could be found unreasonably dangerous, the Utah Supreme Court held that duty, breach, causation, and comparative fault could not be decided on summary judgment and sent the case back for trial-level proceedings.