## Facts

- Thomas Williams (born 1934) had limited education and past work including welding in a steel drum factory and employment as a security guard.
- He alleged disability based on physical conditions including arthritis, lumbar/back problems, and diabetes; he used a cane and took insulin and pain medication.
- Williams filed for Title II disability insurance benefits in October 1987, alleging disability beginning October 1986; the claim was denied and not appealed.
- He filed a second application in June 1988; it was denied initially in December 1988.
- After an ALJ hearing in August 1989, the ALJ found Williams disabled as of March 28, 1988, but not disabled before that date, and found he retained capacity for medium work with limitations (including avoiding complex tasks).
- The ALJ decision advised that Appeals Council review would cover the entire record and could result in a less favorable outcome.
- Williams sought Appeals Council review limited to the onset date, seeking an earlier onset and retroactive benefits.
- The Appeals Council reviewed the full record, reversed the ALJ’s partially favorable decision, and found Williams not disabled at any relevant time, concluding his severe impairments did not preclude past work as a security guard.
- The record included a psychological evaluation reporting a verbal IQ score of 66; Williams argued this, combined with other impairments, satisfied Listing 12.05(C).

## Issues

1. Whether substantial evidence supported the Appeals Council’s determination that Williams did not meet or equal Listing 12.05(C), including the requirement of deficits with onset before age 22.
2. Whether the Appeals Council had authority, upon granting review requested by the claimant, to reverse the ALJ’s favorable disability finding and deny benefits entirely.
3. Whether substantial evidence supported the Appeals Council’s findings on residual functional capacity and ability to perform past relevant work at step four of the sequential evaluation.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the Secretary’s final decision (the Appeals Council’s decision).
- The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Williams did not meet Listing 12.05(C), because the record did not establish developmental-period onset and an adult IQ score alone was insufficient.
- The court held that substantial evidence supported the determination that Williams could perform his past relevant work as a security guard, making a step-five analysis unnecessary.
- The court held that the Appeals Council acted within its regulatory authority to review the entire case and issue a less favorable decision after the claimant requested review and was warned of that possibility.

## Legal Principles

- Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review is limited to whether the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence; courts may not reweigh evidence or substitute their judgment for the agency’s factfinding.
- Disability determinations follow the five-step sequential evaluation; the claimant bears the burden through step four, and the burden shifts to the agency at step five only if the analysis reaches that stage.
- To satisfy Listing 12.05(C), a claimant must show a qualifying IQ score and deficits in adaptive functioning with onset before age 22, plus another significant impairment; an IQ score obtained in adulthood, standing alone, does not establish developmental-period onset.
- When the Appeals Council grants review, it may consider the entire record and is not limited to the issues raised by the claimant; it may revise favorable portions of an ALJ decision if the claimant had adequate notice and the outcome is supported by the record.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit upheld the Appeals Council’s complete denial of disability benefits, concluding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Listing 12.05(C) was not met absent proof of onset before age 22 and that Williams retained the capacity to perform his past work as a security guard, and further holding that the Appeals Council could reverse the ALJ’s partial award on claimant-initiated review.


Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir. 1992)