## Facts

- Megan Wilson alleged that her father physically and sexually abused her while she and her family belonged to and attended a parish church and school from 1987 to 1989.
- Father Charles Kottas served as an associate pastor and school teacher; the family met with him for family counseling in late April and early May 1988. He had training in human development but was not a licensed mental-health counselor.
- Wilson met frequently with Kimary H. Darr, the school guidance counselor at the parish school.
- After Wilson’s father moved out of the home in December 1988, Wilson told Darr in spring 1989 that her father had sexually abused her until he moved out.
- In January 1989, the family began counseling with Ellen Taylor, a licensed counselor employed by Catholic Social Services.
- In February 1989, Wilson attempted suicide and began seeing a hospital social worker who later opined that Wilson showed symptoms consistent with sexual abuse.
- Wilson sued Kottas, Darr, and Taylor for failing to report suspected child abuse under Iowa’s mandatory-reporting statute and sued the church and Catholic Social Services for vicarious liability and for negligent training/supervision and failure to implement reporting procedures; she also asserted negligent counseling against Taylor.

## Issues

1. Whether Kottas, Darr, and Taylor qualified as mandatory reporters under Iowa Code § 232.69 (1989) and, if so, whether their duty to report was triggered by information they received.
2. Whether the summary-judgment record showed breach and causation under the mandatory-reporting statute.
3. Whether Iowa common law imposed an independent duty on clergy, school personnel, or counselors to discover, diagnose, or report a parent’s sexual abuse absent a triggered statutory duty.
4. Whether the institutional defendants could be liable vicariously or directly for negligent training/supervision or failure to establish reporting procedures.

## Decision

- The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Father Kottas, Darr, Taylor, Sacred Heart Church, and Catholic Social Services.
- The court concluded the record did not establish statutory liability for failure to report because mandatory-reporter status and the statutory threshold for reporting were not shown on the facts presented.
- The court rejected using retrospective expert characterizations that abuse “should have been obvious” to create a triable issue about what a defendant actually knew or reasonably suspected when a report would have been required.
- The court found no sufficient basis for liability under common-law negligence theories, including Taylor’s negligent counseling claim.
- Because employee liability was not established and independent institutional negligence and causation were not supported by the record, vicarious and direct claims against the church and Catholic Social Services failed.

## Legal Principles

- Liability for failure to report child abuse under Iowa’s mandatory-reporting statute requires proof that the defendant fell within a statutory reporter category and that the defendant had information that met the statute’s reporting trigger at the relevant time.
- A plaintiff must produce evidence creating a genuine issue on breach and proximate causation; an after-the-fact expert opinion that abuse indicators were “obvious” is insufficient, by itself, to establish that the statutory reporting threshold was met.
- Iowa courts will not impose a broad common-law duty on clergy, school staff, or counselors to detect and report abuse absent a clearly applicable statutory duty or an established professional standard supported by the record.
- Vicarious liability depends on underlying employee liability; direct institutional negligence claims also require proof of breach and causation linking alleged training/procedure failures to the plaintiff’s harm.

## Conclusion

The court upheld summary judgment because the evidence did not show that any individual defendant had a triggered mandatory-reporting duty (or breached an applicable standard of care), and without underlying wrongdoing or proof of causation, the institutional defendants could not be held vicariously or directly liable.


Wilson v. Darr, 553 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1996)