## Facts

- Jewel Jones Greer executed a 1997 last will and testament and died in 2000.
- The will divided Greer’s estate into equal shares for 17 beneficiaries: 16 blood relatives and Katherine Lane, a non-relative who cared for Greer and was named executrix.
- Lane, as propounder and executrix, offered the will for probate; Floyd Wilson and others filed a caveat alleging Greer lacked testamentary capacity when she signed the will.
- At trial in the Jasper County Superior Court, the drafting attorney testified that, in his opinion, Greer was mentally competent when the will was executed and that she emphatically selected each beneficiary named in it.
- Friends and acquaintances also testified Greer had a clear mind at the time the will was signed.
- Caveators presented evidence that, in Greer’s later years, she was aged, feeble, and eccentric, including an irrational fear that her house would flood, difficulty dressing and bathing, and calling the fire department about a fire that did not exist.
- Caveators also relied on evidence suggesting possible Alzheimer’s disease or senile dementia, including medical information reviewed by an expert.
- A petition seeking a guardianship for Greer was filed a few months after the will’s execution; it asserted Greer could no longer manage her affairs and attributed her condition to Alzheimer’s-related dementia.
- Evidence indicated the guardianship petition was filed in response to concerns raised by the Department of Family and Children’s Services and was intended to help Greer remain in her home.
- The medical expert acknowledged he did not personally examine Greer and based his opinion solely on records; his report suggested Greer may have been in early-to-mid stage dementia.

## Issues

1. Whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the caveators, there was any evidence that Greer lacked testamentary capacity when she executed the 1997 will.
2. Whether the trial court properly granted Lane’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury found Greer lacked testamentary capacity.

## Decision

- The jury returned a verdict that Greer lacked testamentary capacity and rejected the will.
- The trial court granted Lane’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), setting aside the jury’s verdict.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.
- The court held the propounder’s evidence created a presumption of testamentary capacity, and the caveators presented no evidence that Greer was incapable of forming a decided and rational desire concerning the disposition of her property at the time of execution.

## Legal Principles

- A testator has testamentary capacity if she has sufficient intellect to form a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of her property.
- The law permits the aged, feeble, weak-minded, and eccentric to make a will if the testator can still form the decided and rational desire required for the testament.
- Eccentric habits, odd conduct, and absurd beliefs, standing alone, do not establish testamentary incapacity.
- When the propounder offers evidence from the drafting attorney and other witnesses that the testator was of sound mind at execution, a presumption of testamentary capacity arises, shifting to the caveators the burden to produce evidence of incapacity at the time the will was executed.
- A later guardianship petition and generalized evidence of dementia do not rebut capacity unless tied to the testator’s condition on the execution date.
- JNOV is appropriate where, even taking the evidence in the non-movant’s favor, there is no evidence to support the jury’s verdict under the governing legal standard.

## Conclusion

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed JNOV for Lane because the propounder’s witnesses established a presumption that Greer was competent when she executed her 1997 will, and the caveators’ proof—focused on eccentric behavior, physical decline, a later-filed guardianship petition, and a records-only medical opinion suggesting dementia—did not supply evidence that Greer lacked the ability to form a decided and rational desire regarding the disposition of her property at the time the will was signed.


Wilson v. Lane, 614 S.E.2d 88, 279 Ga. 492 (2005)