## Facts

- On October 15, 1980, Christopher Wilson shot and killed his friend, Rodney Brown, while Wilson, Brown, and two other men were together discussing who would be first to use heroin they possessed.
- Wilson was indicted in New Jersey state court for aggravated manslaughter and possession of a handgun without a permit.
- Wilson did not contest that he fired the weapon. His defense was mistake of fact: he testified he was unfamiliar with the gun, removed the magazine, believed he had disarmed it, and pointed it at Brown “in a joking attempt to frighten him.”
- A round remained in the chamber. When Wilson pulled the trigger, the gun discharged and fatally wounded Brown.
- Wilson contended his mistaken belief that the gun was unloaded was reasonable and, if accepted, meant he did not act “recklessly,” the mental state required for a manslaughter conviction under New Jersey law.
- At trial, the judge instructed the jury that Wilson bore the burden to prove his mistake-of-fact defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The jury convicted Wilson of simple manslaughter and unlawful handgun possession. He received a prison sentence on the manslaughter conviction and a concurrent sentence on the weapons offense.
- On direct appeal, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that pointing a gun at another person and firing constitutes recklessness as a matter of law (“reckless per se”). The New Jersey Supreme Court denied further review.
- After exhausting state remedies, Wilson filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the jury instructions violated due process by shifting to him the burden on an element of the offense.

## Issues

1. Whether due process is violated when a jury is instructed that the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a mistake-of-fact claim that would negate the recklessness element of manslaughter.
2. Whether a state appellate court’s “reckless per se” rationale can cure or render harmless a trial court instruction that placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant as to the contested mental state.

## Decision

- The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted Wilson’s § 2254 petition.
- The court held that the trial court’s charge improperly allocated to Wilson the burden of proving a defense that, if believed, would directly negate the culpability element (recklessness) the State was required to prove.
- The court rejected the argument that the Appellate Division’s statement that the conduct was “reckless per se” eliminated the constitutional problem; the constitutional question turned on what the jury was told and how the burden was assigned at trial.
- Because state of mind was the key disputed point at trial, the burden-shifting instruction was prejudicial. The court ordered habeas relief requiring the State to afford Wilson a new trial (or otherwise release him) consistent with constitutional requirements.

## Legal Principles

- Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the charged offense. (In re Winship)
- A state may not shift to the defendant the burden of persuasion on a fact that functions as an element of the offense, including the required mental state. (Mullaney v. Wilbur; Sandstrom v. Montana)
- A mistake-of-fact contention that, if credited, would show the defendant lacked the required mens rea is not an “affirmative defense” the defendant must prove; it is part of the prosecution’s burden to establish culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.
- An appellate court’s after-the-fact characterization of conduct as “reckless per se” does not fix a trial instruction that told jurors to convict unless the defendant proved the absence of recklessness; the jury must be properly instructed on the prosecution’s burden.
- When the disputed issue at trial is the defendant’s mental state, an instruction that misallocates the burden on that issue cannot be treated as harmless simply because the reviewing court believes the evidence was strong.

## Conclusion

Wilson v. Tard held that New Jersey’s jury instructions violated due process by requiring Wilson to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a mistake of fact that would negate recklessness—an element the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt—and the state appellate court’s “reckless per se” reasoning did not cure that burden-shifting error, so federal habeas relief was warranted and a new trial was required.


Wilson v. Tard, 593 F. Supp. 1091 (1984)