## Facts

- Four federal prisoners at FCI Elkton and its satellite facility filed a putative class petition on behalf of themselves and similarly situated inmates, focusing on medically vulnerable prisoners during the COVID-19 outbreak.
- Petitioners proceeded under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and sought release-or-transfer-type relief on the theory that exposure risk made continued confinement unconstitutional for vulnerable inmates.
- The district court certified a medically vulnerable subclass.
- The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to promptly evaluate each subclass member for transfer by available mechanisms (including compassionate release and home confinement-type options), to transfer certain prisoners to other facilities, and to restrict returns to Elkton unless conditions were met.
- BOP officials appealed interlocutorily, disputing § 2241 jurisdiction and the scope of habeas relief, arguing the action belonged under civil conditions litigation governed by the PLRA, and challenging the Eighth Amendment merits and the injunction.

## Issues

1. Whether § 2241 provides habeas jurisdiction for medically vulnerable prisoners seeking release-oriented relief based on COVID-19 conditions, as opposed to requiring a civil conditions action subject to the PLRA.
2. Whether petitioners showed a likelihood of success on an Eighth Amendment claim that BOP officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm from COVID-19 at Elkton.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by granting a preliminary injunction ordering broad evaluation and transfer-related measures.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit held that § 2241 jurisdiction existed to the extent petitioners sought relief that would necessarily result in immediate or speedier release, but it stated that § 2241 does not authorize certain broad forms of relief resembling institutional management directives.
- The court accepted that COVID-19 posed a serious risk to prisoners and that Elkton’s congregate conditions heightened the risk, satisfying (or effectively assuming) the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim.
- The court concluded petitioners did not demonstrate a likelihood of proving the subjective component—deliberate indifference—because the record reflected multiple mitigation steps by BOP officials to address the outbreak.
- Because likelihood of success on the merits was not shown, the court vacated the preliminary injunction.
- A separate opinion concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing on jurisdiction but disagreeing with the majority’s deliberate-indifference assessment and its decision to vacate the injunction.

## Legal Principles

- A § 2241 habeas petition may be an available vehicle when prisoners contend that no set of conditions can be constitutionally sufficient and seek relief that would necessarily result in immediate or speedier release, but habeas does not generally authorize sweeping, structural oversight of prison operations.
- An Eighth Amendment conditions claim requires (1) an objectively serious risk of harm and (2) a subjectively culpable state of mind: officials must know of and disregard an excessive risk; negligence or an imperfect response is insufficient.
- When officials undertake documented, multi-pronged measures to mitigate a serious health risk, that response can defeat a showing of deliberate indifference at the preliminary-injunction stage.
- A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy; failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits supports vacatur as an abuse of discretion.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s COVID-19-related preliminary injunction for medically vulnerable inmates at FCI Elkton, holding that although § 2241 could support release-oriented habeas relief in this context, petitioners failed to show a likelihood of proving Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference given BOP’s mitigation efforts, and the injunction therefore could not stand.


Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020)