## Facts

- On Interstate 95 in Bangor, Maine (a divided, limited-access highway), Clifford Wing, Jr., traveling northbound, attempted an illegal U-turn across the median into the southbound lanes.
- Wing’s maneuver caused a collision with a southbound automobile towing a house trailer, leaving the automobile and trailer positioned so as to obstruct at least part of the southbound travel lanes.
- A state police officer arrived shortly thereafter, stopped on the median strip, and activated a blue light.
- Southbound vehicles slowed and formed a backed-up line extending as much as roughly one-half mile from the accident scene.
- About ten minutes after the initial collision, Bernard L. Morse, driving a tractor-trailer southbound, approached the backed-up traffic and failed to stop in time, colliding with vehicles in the line and sustaining personal injuries.
- Morse sued Wing for personal injuries arising from the second collision, alleging Wing’s initial negligence set in motion the conditions leading to Morse’s crash.
- A jury found total damages of $12,000 and deducted $200 for Morse’s contributory fault; judgment entered for $11,800.
- Wing appealed, arguing his negligence was not the proximate cause of Morse’s injuries and that the trial court erred in denying a directed verdict and in refusing requested causation instructions.

## Issues

1. Whether Wing’s illegal U-turn and resulting obstruction could be found a proximate cause of Morse’s later injuries, despite the passage of time and Morse’s alleged negligent driving.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to adequately instruct the jury on proximate cause, concurrent negligence, and intervening versus superseding cause.

## Decision

- The appellate court sustained Wing’s appeal and ordered a new trial.
- The court declined to rule, as a matter of law, that Wing’s negligence was too remote to be a proximate cause of Morse’s injuries.
- The court held the jury instructions on causation were inadequate because they did not sufficiently explain concurrent negligence and intervening/superseding cause in the context of a secondary collision following an initial highway obstruction.
- The judgment for Morse was vacated, and the case was remanded for retrial with proper instructions on liability and causation.

## Legal Principles

- When multiple negligent acts combine to cause injury, a defendant is not relieved of liability merely because another person’s negligence also contributed; concurrent negligence may support liability for resulting harm.
- An intervening act does not break the causal chain unless it is a superseding cause—an independent, unforeseeable act that becomes the sole proximate cause of the injury.
- In multi-event accident cases, whether the initial negligence remained a substantial contributing cause, or whether later conduct constituted a superseding cause, is generally a jury question when reasonable factfinders could differ.
- Jury instructions must clearly address proximate cause in the presence of potential concurrent negligence and explain how to evaluate intervening versus superseding causes; failure to do so can be prejudicial error requiring a new trial.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial because the causation question—whether the hazard created by Wing’s illegal U-turn remained a proximate cause of Morse’s later collision or was superseded by intervening negligence—had to be decided by a properly instructed jury.


Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491 (Me. 1973)