## Facts

- The Constitution’s Census Clause requires an “actual Enumeration” every ten years to apportion representatives among the states.
- Congress delegated census administration to the Secretary of Commerce through federal statutes governing the decennial census and apportionment.
- For the 1990 census, the Census Bureau developed a post-enumeration survey (PES) to estimate and correct undercount in the initial count, including disproportionate undercounts of certain minority and urban populations.
- After study and review, the Secretary decided not to use PES-based statistical adjustment in the official state population totals used for congressional apportionment, concluding the census would best achieve an “actual Enumeration” without the adjustment.
- Cities, states, and advocacy groups challenged the decision, alleging it worsened minority undercounts, affected representation and funding, and violated the Census Clause and equal protection principles (via the Fifth Amendment).
- The district court upheld the Secretary’s decision; the Second Circuit reversed, applying heightened review based on vote-dilution concerns and disparate impact on minority groups.

## Issues

1. Whether the Secretary’s refusal to statistically adjust the 1990 census is subject to heightened “one person, one vote” scrutiny or to a more deferential standard tied to the Census Clause and apportionment.
2. Whether the refusal to use the PES adjustment was consistent with the Census Clause and governing federal statutes.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the Secretary’s decision (unanimous opinion).
- The Court rejected heightened scrutiny and held review asks whether the decision is consistent with the Constitution’s language and the constitutional goal of equal representation.
- The Court held it was reasonable for the Secretary to conclude that an “actual Enumeration” for apportionment purposes would best be achieved without PES-based adjustment.
- The Court found no showing of intentional discrimination; disparate impact alone did not justify applying strict scrutiny to this census methodology choice.

## Legal Principles

- The Census Clause gives Congress broad discretion over how to conduct the decennial “actual Enumeration,” including choice of methodology; Congress may delegate that authority to the Secretary of Commerce.
- Census methodology and apportionment-related decisions are reviewed for consistency with the constitutional text and the goal of equal representation, not under strict “one person, one vote” scrutiny absent purposeful discrimination.
- The Secretary may reasonably prioritize distributive accuracy among states for apportionment over maximizing numerical accuracy, where technical tradeoffs and uncertainty support that judgment.
- Courts owe substantial deference to the political branches and delegated administrators on technical census choices and will not invalidate such choices without a clear constitutional or statutory violation.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the Commerce Secretary’s refusal to use a post-enumeration survey to adjust 1990 census apportionment totals was a permissible exercise of delegated authority under the Census Clause and statutes, subject to deferential review and not strict scrutiny absent proof of intentional discrimination.


Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996)