## Facts

- Jo Ann Wallace Wolfe and John Walton Wolfe married in 1949 and executed a separation agreement in 1967.
- The agreement required Mr. Wolfe to pay periodic “support and maintenance” alimony of $35,000 per year until Mrs. Wolfe’s remarriage or death, and made the obligation a charge against his estate.
- The agreement also required a $350,000 lump-sum payment characterized as a division of property and additional satisfaction of support obligations, also binding on Mr. Wolfe’s estate.
- A divorce decree adopted and incorporated the separation agreement.
- After divorce, Mr. Wolfe sought to terminate or modify the periodic sustenance alimony based on alleged post-divorce unchastity and argued the court lacked power to modify obligations grounded in contract.

## Issues

1. Whether an alimony award that constitutes a division of marital assets and liabilities is subject to modification under the court’s continuing jurisdiction.
2. Whether a decree awarding periodic sustenance alimony until remarriage or death implies a reservation of jurisdiction to modify, even when the award derives from an incorporated separation agreement.
3. Whether a former spouse’s post-divorce unchastity automatically terminates alimony, or is only relevant to modification based on need and amount.
4. Whether an incorporated separation agreement remains a contract limiting modification under contract-impairment principles, or merges into the decree.

## Decision

- The court held that an award functioning as a property division is not subject to later modification.
- The court held that when periodic alimony is for sustenance and support, payable until remarriage or death, and independent of property-rights adjustment, jurisdiction to modify is implied in the decree.
- The court held that post-divorce unchastity does not automatically terminate alimony, but may be considered in a modification proceeding if relevant to continued need and the appropriate amount.
- The court held that a separation agreement loses its contractual character upon adoption and incorporation into a divorce decree; the obligations thereafter derive from the decree and statutory domestic-relations authority, not contract law.

## Legal Principles

- Courts lack continuing jurisdiction to modify a final division of marital assets and liabilities, even if labeled “alimony.”
- Sustenance/support alimony is generally modifiable; where payable until remarriage or death and separate from property division, a decree implies a reservation of jurisdiction to modify.
- Post-decree sexual conduct is not an automatic bar to support; it is relevant only insofar as it bears on financial circumstances, including continued need and amount.
- Incorporation of a separation agreement into a divorce decree merges the agreement into the judgment, defeating claims that later modification unconstitutionally impairs a private contract.

## Conclusion

The decision drew a firm line between nonmodifiable property division and modifiable sustenance alimony, confirmed that incorporated separation agreements merge into the decree, and limited post-divorce unchastity to an evidentiary role in assessing changed need and appropriate support.


Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399 (Ohio 1976)