## Facts

- John Louis Visciotti, a California state prisoner sentenced to death, sought postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase.
- Visciotti and an accomplice planned and carried out a robbery of two coworkers; during the incident Visciotti shot and killed one victim and shot the other multiple times, who survived and testified.
- A jury convicted Visciotti of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery, found a robbery-murder special circumstance, and returned a death verdict; the state judgment was affirmed on direct review.
- In state habeas proceedings, the state high court assumed (without deciding) deficient penalty-phase performance but denied relief for lack of Strickland prejudice after record development.
- Visciotti then pursued federal habeas relief; the federal district court granted sentencing relief, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the state court decision “contrary to” and an “unreasonable application” of Strickland under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the Ninth Circuit applied AEDPA’s limits correctly.

## Issues

1. Whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the state court’s denial of penalty-phase relief was “contrary to” Strickland because it allegedly applied a higher prejudice standard than “reasonable probability.”
2. Whether the state court’s no-prejudice determination was an “unreasonable application” of Strickland, permitting federal habeas relief under AEDPA.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion.
- The Court held the Ninth Circuit exceeded § 2254(d)’s constraints on federal habeas review.
- The Court rejected the conclusion that the state court applied the wrong prejudice standard, emphasizing the presumption that state courts know and follow governing law.
- The Court held the state court’s no-prejudice determination was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland, even if a federal court might weigh mitigating evidence differently on de novo review.
- The Ninth Circuit’s judgment affirming habeas relief as to the sentence was reversed, leaving the state denial of penalty-phase relief in place.

## Legal Principles

- Under Strickland v. Washington, prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” of a different result, not proof that a different outcome was “more likely than not.”
- Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law or involves an “unreasonable application” of that law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
- AEDPA review is highly deferential; federal courts must give state-court decisions the benefit of the doubt and may not treat minor wording variations as proof that the state court applied the wrong legal standard.
- A federal habeas court may not substitute its own weighing of aggravating and mitigating evidence for a state court’s Strickland prejudice analysis unless the state court’s application is objectively unreasonable.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court enforced AEDPA’s deferential standard by reversing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of penalty-phase habeas relief, holding that the state court neither applied a prejudice standard “contrary to” Strickland nor reached a prejudice determination that was objectively unreasonable under § 2254(d).


Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002)