## Facts

- Three brothers (R.D., S.D., and B.D.) were adjudicated Children in Need of Services (CHINS) in June 1994 and placed in foster care under the supervision of the county child-welfare agency.
- In 1995, the brothers were placed with Michael and Jacintha Worrell as foster parents.
- The children lived with the Worrells for approximately 17 to 19 months, during which time the Worrells alleged they developed a parental bond with the children.
- The agency removed the children from the Worrells’ home after an incident involving the Worrells’ twelve-year-old biological daughter and twelve-year-old B.D., described as “kissing and holding hands.”
- B.D. was moved first; roughly two months later, R.D. and S.D. were also moved, and all three boys were ultimately placed in the same new foster home.
- After removal, the Worrells filed petitions within the existing CHINS proceedings seeking court-ordered visitation with each child.
- At a hearing, Jacintha Worrell testified about the duration and nature of the foster placement and the asserted relationship between the Worrells and the children.
- The agency moved to dismiss the visitation petitions, contending the Worrells lacked standing as former foster parents to seek visitation.

## Issues

1. Whether former foster parents have standing under Indiana law to petition for court-ordered visitation with children formerly placed in their foster care.
2. Whether Indiana’s common-law doctrine allowing limited third-party visitation extends to former foster parents based on a prior custodial or parent-like relationship.
3. Whether, absent standing, a court may reach a “best interests of the child” determination on visitation requested by former foster parents.

## Decision

- The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
- The Court held former foster parents, as a category, do not have standing to seek court-ordered visitation with children formerly in their care.
- The Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the visitation petitions.
- Because standing was absent as a matter of law, the Court held no evidentiary hearing on visitation or the children’s best interests was required.

## Legal Principles

- Standing is a threshold jurisdictional requirement; without a legally recognized basis to seek visitation, a court does not proceed to a merits-based “best interests” inquiry.
- Indiana’s judge-made third-party visitation doctrine is narrow and historically limited to carefully defined non-parent categories (commonly addressed in cases involving stepparents after dissolution or death of a natural parent).
- A former foster parent’s close relationship or psychological bond with a child, without more, does not create a legally cognizable claim to visitation.
- Foster care placements are state-regulated, temporary, and contingent; foster parents’ status arises from licensing and agency placement decisions rather than a durable legal tie like marriage to a parent.
- In the absence of a statutory grant of post-placement visitation rights for foster parents, courts should not expand third-party visitation standing to create a new class of visitation claimants.
- Expanding standing beyond narrow categories risks increased litigation by unrelated parties and interferes with the child-welfare agency’s statutory responsibilities for placement and permanency planning.

## Conclusion

The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that former foster parents lack standing to petition for court-ordered visitation with children previously placed in their home, and it affirmed dismissal of the visitation petitions without a best-interests hearing.


Worrell v. Elkhart Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 704 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1998)