## Facts

- A nonprofit social club in Houston operated with a state private-club permit for alcohol service and maintained membership categories funded by dues.
- The club’s admission practices were loose: applications were readily provided, screening was minimal, and nonmembers frequently used the facilities as “guests” for events.
- In 1967, a Black sorority member contacted the club to arrange a luncheon and style show; the club’s resident auditor indicated membership was unnecessary and that the group could attend as guests.
- The auditor sent membership applications; Mrs. Noah Wright, a Black woman, applied for Class “A” membership, paid dues, and received a membership card.
- Wright and companions twice visited the club, presented the card or appeared as guests, and were served.
- The auditor later wrote that “the matter of integration” had not been presented to the membership and that Wright’s card would not be “active” until a future membership vote.
- The planned sorority event was canceled, and Wright’s membership status was suspended pending the vote.
- In January 1968, Class “A” members voted overwhelmingly against integration, and the club refused to accept Black members; Wright was denied membership and use of facilities solely because of race.
- Wright sued for injunctive relief, asserting constitutional and statutory claims, including Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts.

## Issues

1. Whether the club qualified for Title II’s “private club” exemption or instead operated as a place of public accommodation subject to Title II’s ban on racial discrimination.
2. Whether the club’s operations affected interstate commerce sufficient to trigger Title II coverage.
3. Whether denying Wright membership and access because she was Black violated Title II.

## Decision

- The court held the club was not a bona fide private club and therefore was not exempt under Title II.
- The court found the club’s operations affected interstate commerce for Title II purposes.
- The court concluded the club’s denial of membership and access to Wright because of race violated Title II.
- The court entered judgment for Wright and issued injunctive relief barring race-based denial of membership or use of the club’s facilities; it did not rely on alternative constitutional or statutory theories because Title II provided adequate relief.

## Legal Principles

- Title II’s private-club exemption applies only to establishments that are genuinely private and “not in fact open to the public”; the exemption is construed narrowly.
- Whether an establishment is a private club turns on functional facts, including: meaningful selectivity in admissions, member control over membership decisions, the extent of nonmember use, commercial or business characteristics, and how the establishment presents itself to the public.
- A state-law private-club permit or formal corporate status does not control if operating practices show the establishment is effectively open to the public.
- Once an establishment is a covered public accommodation under Title II, exclusion or differential treatment based on race is unlawful and may be enjoined.

## Conclusion

The court determined that the club’s lax admissions practices, routine nonmember access, and commercial ties showed it was not genuinely private, bringing it within Title II; because Wright was excluded solely due to race, the court enjoined the club from denying membership or facilities on that basis.


Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970)