## Facts

- David C. Wright died in 1952; virtually all property titled in his name at death was community property with his widow, May M. Wright.
- David executed a 1950 will that was duly probated; it made substantial gifts to collateral relatives and a ranch employee and also provided benefits to May, who was named an executrix and beneficiary.
- Because the will made specific dispositions of community assets, the other executors/beneficiaries contended the will purported to dispose of May’s one-half community interest as well as David’s, triggering the doctrine of election.
- The other executors/beneficiaries sought declarations that (1) May must elect between taking under the will and asserting her community rights, (2) she had already elected to reject the will, and (3) the parties’ rights under certain will provisions; they also pleaded contingent claims about separate-property characterization and reimbursement for improvements if May rejected the will.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment that an election was required and construed certain will provisions, but denied summary judgment on whether May had actually elected to reject the will.
- The court of civil appeals reversed in part, concluding the will did not require an election.

## Issues

1. Whether the will disposed of the widow’s community interest so as to require her to elect between her community-property rights and benefits under the will.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper to decide (a) the will’s construction and the existence of an election requirement and (b) whether the widow had, as a matter of law, already elected to reject the will.

## Decision

- The Texas Supreme Court held the will required the widow to make an election because it purported to dispose of community property interests belonging to her while also granting her benefits under the will.
- The Court held summary judgment was an appropriate vehicle to construe the will and to decide the legal question that an election was required on the undisputed property status.
- The Court left for further proceedings the fact-dependent question whether the widow had actually elected to reject the will; summary judgment on that point was properly denied.
- The Court reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the trial court’s partial summary judgment requiring an election and construing the will, while remanding remaining matters.

## Legal Principles

- A beneficiary may not accept benefits under a will while asserting an inconsistent property right that would defeat, impair, or prevent full operation of the will’s dispositive scheme.
- When a will assumes to dispose of property not wholly owned by the testator (including the surviving spouse’s share of community property) and also provides benefits to the true owner, the owner is put to an election: accept the will and surrender inconsistent rights, or reject the will and retain those rights.
- Summary judgment may resolve pure questions of law, including construction of an unambiguous written will and the legal existence of an election requirement based on undisputed facts.
- Whether a beneficiary has actually made an election by conduct (e.g., acceptance of benefits or inconsistent acts) is ordinarily a factual question not suited to summary judgment when material facts are disputed or require evidentiary development.

## Conclusion

The court held the widow was required to elect because the will effectively disposed of community assets including her interest, and it approved summary judgment for will construction and the election requirement while reserving the fact issue of whether she had already elected.


Wright v. Wright, 274 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1955)