## Facts

- Shawn Wyke, age 13, attended a Polk County public junior high school and lived with Helen Schmidt, his caregiver.
- In the days before his death, Shawn attempted suicide twice at school during school hours.
- First attempt: another student found Shawn trying to hang himself in a school restroom; the student’s mother contacted the school, and a school official spoke with Shawn but did not notify Wyke or Schmidt.
- Second attempt: a custodian reported to the vice-principal that a student said he would have killed himself if he had stayed longer in the restroom; no further action was taken.
- School officials did not hold Shawn for protection, did not provide or obtain counseling services, and did not notify Wyke or Schmidt of the attempts.
- On October 17, 1989, Shawn died by suicide at home; Wyke and Schmidt lacked knowledge of imminent suicidal intent but knew he had emotional and behavioral problems.
- Wyke sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process) and under Florida negligence law (including failure to train and failure to notify).
- The district court dismissed the § 1983 claim but tried the negligence claims; the jury found for Wyke and allocated fault 33% to the School Board, 32% to Wyke, and 35% to Schmidt.
- Both sides appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the federal § 1983 claim was so insubstantial that it failed to confer federal-question jurisdiction.
2. Whether the school district and administrators violated due process by failing to provide suicide intervention or by failing to notify Shawn’s parent/caregiver of the attempts.
3. Whether Florida negligence law imposed a duty on the School Board to prevent the suicide and/or to notify a parent/caregiver of known suicide attempts occurring at school.
4. Whether Florida comparative-fault law required inclusion of additional persons on the verdict form for allocation of fault.

## Decision

- Federal-question jurisdiction existed because the § 1983 theory was not frivolous, even though it failed on the merits.
- The § 1983 claim was properly dismissed: the defendants did not violate Shawn’s constitutional rights by failing to prevent self-harm or by failing to notify his parent/caregiver.
- Under Florida negligence law, the School Board owed a duty to notify a parent or stand-in guardian of known suicide attempts occurring on school grounds during school hours; the negligence verdict on that theory was upheld.
- The comparative-fault allocation issue was treated as unresolved under Florida law and was certified to the Florida Supreme Court.

## Legal Principles

- A federal claim that ultimately fails may still be sufficient to support federal-question jurisdiction unless it is wholly insubstantial or frivolous.
- Under the Due Process Clause, the state generally has no affirmative constitutional duty to protect a person from private harm, including self-harm, absent a custodial relationship comparable to incarceration or institutionalization or an applicable state-created danger theory.
- Compulsory school attendance, without more, does not create the type of custody that triggers an affirmative federal constitutional duty to protect a student from self-harm.
- Under Florida negligence law, when school officials are aware of a student’s suicide attempt at school during school hours, the school district has a duty to notify the parent or responsible caregiver of that emergency condition.
- Questions about which persons must appear on a verdict form for apportionment of fault under Florida comparative-fault doctrine may require authoritative resolution by Florida courts when state law is unsettled.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had federal jurisdiction but that the school officials’ failures did not amount to a federal due process violation under § 1983; it sustained negligence liability under Florida law based on the school district’s duty to notify a parent or caregiver of known suicide attempts at school and certified the unsettled comparative-fault allocation question to the Florida Supreme Court.


Wyke v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560 (11th Cir. 1997)