## Facts

- Thomas Yakavonis and Sonja Tilton were in a relationship for nine years and, during that time, acquired several residential properties as tenants in common.
- The relationship ended in 1986; the parties sold most of the properties and divided the proceeds, but retained two properties commonly referred to as Parcel A and Parcel B.
- Parcel A was a house Tilton had previously owned; during the relationship she conveyed a one-half interest to Yakavonis. After the breakup, Tilton moved into Parcel A and continued living there.
- Parcel B was used as a rental property; on the second appeal, the parties did not dispute the accounting for Parcel B.
- In 1992, Yakavonis sued to partition the properties.
- The trial court’s initial decision (effective April 1, 1994) quieted title to the parcels in Tilton and awarded her offsets for expenses. Because the offsets exceeded Yakavonis’s share, the court entered a money judgment for Tilton of $5,793.47.
- On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals held Yakavonis and Tilton were equal co-owners and remanded for an accounting of costs and benefits up to partition.
- On remand, the trial court appointed an accountant and addressed whether Tilton’s exclusive occupancy of Parcel A should be treated as a benefit (rental value) chargeable to her.
- The trial court ruled Tilton would not be charged rental value absent an ouster, found ouster occurred on January 1, 1997, and entered a modified judgment for Tilton of $8,459.50.
- Yakavonis appealed again, arguing the trial court used the wrong ouster date and therefore failed to account for Tilton’s exclusive use of Parcel A beginning earlier.

## Issues

1. Did the trial court err by finding ouster occurred on January 1, 1997, rather than on April 1, 1994, when the earlier decree denied Yakavonis’s ownership interest?
2. If ouster occurred earlier, must the accounting include the reasonable rental value (or other measure of exclusive-possession benefit) of Parcel A from the ouster date?
3. In an accounting involving two separate parcels, must the trial court enter separate judgments for each parcel rather than a single combined judgment?

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals held Yakavonis was ousted as of April 1, 1994, by the trial court decision that wrongly declared he had no ownership interest.
- The court reversed the trial court’s January 1, 1997 ouster finding.
- The court remanded with instructions to recalculate the accounting using April 1, 1994 as the ouster date, which affects any rental-value component tied to Tilton’s exclusive possession of Parcel A.
- The court directed the trial court to enter separate judgments for each parcel.

## Legal Principles

- A cotenant in possession generally is not liable to a non-possessing cotenant for rent (or rental value) absent an agreement to pay rent or an ouster.
- Ouster occurs when one cotenant clearly repudiates the cotenancy and denies the other cotenant’s ownership rights, giving the excluded cotenant notice of that denial.
- A judicial decree that declares one cotenant the sole owner and denies the other cotenant’s interest can constitute an ouster for purposes of a partition accounting, even if the decree is later reversed.
- In a partition-related accounting, the ouster date controls when the occupying cotenant may be charged for the benefit of exclusive possession (such as reasonable rental value).
- Where multiple parcels are involved and the income/expenses and disputed items differ by parcel, the accounting may require separate parcel-by-parcel judgments to accurately state the parties’ rights and obligations.

## Conclusion

The Washington Court of Appeals ruled that the earlier trial court decree denying Yakavonis’s ownership interest constituted an ouster as of April 1, 1994, so the post-remand accounting had to be recalculated using that date (including any rental-value benefit after ouster), and the trial court was required to enter separate judgments for each parcel.


Yakavonis v. Tilton, 968 P.2d 908 (1998)