## Facts

- Lia Yang, a Hmong refugee from Laos, sought Supplemental Security Income (SSI) based on being at least age 65.
- No contemporaneous birth record existed for her claimed birth date (Sept. 24, 1919); Laos later allowed belated birth registration, and Yang obtained a Laotian birth record in 1962 listing 1919.
- After fleeing Laos, Yang’s refugee-camp and initial U.S. immigration-related records listed her birth year as 1929; her original Social Security number application reflected 1929.
- Yang later updated U.S. records to reflect 1919 based on the Laotian birth record and obtained a California Superior Court order determining her birth date.
- The Social Security Administration (SSA) initially granted SSI based on the 1919 birth year but later terminated benefits on the view that Yang was born in 1929 and thus not age-eligible.
- At a de novo hearing, Yang submitted the Laotian birth record, the California court order, a declaration from a former Laotian judge about registration practices, and testimony from herself and her son.
- The Administrative Law Judge upheld termination, treating the initial Social Security number application (not introduced into the administrative record) as conclusive evidence of a 1929 birth year.
- Yang sought judicial review; the matter was remanded, and on remand the agency reinstated SSI benefits based on the 1919 birth year.
- Yang then sought attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); the district court denied fees as untimely.

## Issues

1. Whether Yang’s EAJA fee application was filed within 30 days of “final judgment,” such that the district court had jurisdiction to award fees.
2. Whether the government’s position in the administrative proceedings and ensuing litigation was “substantially justified” under EAJA.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying EAJA fees and remanded with instructions to award reasonable attorney’s fees.
- The court held Yang’s EAJA application was timely under the proper understanding of when “final judgment” occurs in this remand posture.
- The court held the government’s position was not substantially justified given the evidentiary record and the agency’s basis for terminating benefits.

## Legal Principles

- Under EAJA, a prevailing party is entitled to fees unless the government shows its position was substantially justified or special circumstances make a fee award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
- “Substantially justified” requires a reasonable basis in law and fact; the government bears the burden of proof.
- In Social Security cases involving remand proceedings, EAJA’s 30-day filing period runs from the relevant “final judgment” establishing prevailing-party status in the case’s remand posture, rather than from an earlier, merely interim remand event.
- A lack of substantial justification may be shown where the agency relies on an unproduced or unsupported document while disregarding probative official records and a state-court determination of a claimant’s birth date.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit ruled that Yang timely sought EAJA fees after prevailing through remand proceedings and that the government lacked substantial justification for terminating benefits based on an unproduced prior application while discounting official and adjudicated proof of age, requiring an award of attorney’s fees.


Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213 (9th Cir. 1994)